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APRIL, 1970

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Current History

APRIL, 1970

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In this issue eight authors discuss present and future relationships in the Pacific area. Our first author concludes that "The international environment of the vast Asian-Pacific area is uncertain and unpredictable. It is within this unstable environment that the United States as a Pacific power must chart its course for the 1970's."

The United States as a Pacific Power

BY WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE

Professor of Asian Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

NO ONE can see more than a very clouded crystal ball when looking at the future of the United States in the Pacific and the contours of United States policy there during the decade of the 1970's. Yet in 1852, years before he became Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward declared that he foresaw the day when the Atlantic interests of the United States would "relatively shrink in importance, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond would become the chief theatre of events . . . for America."

During the 1960's, Presidents, Secretaries of State and high officials frequently asserted that the United States is a "Pacific Power." No one can deny this assertion. The debate on United States foreign policy towards the Asian-Pacific region in the past decade has largely concerned the use of American power, the definitions of American interests and the nature of United States commitments in this area. This debate is still in progress. It may not be amiss, therefore, to take a brief look at past United States interests in the Pacific before surveying the present and peering into the future.

Over half a century before Seward's declaration, Americans and the American government began developing "interests" in the Pacific Ocean area. American sailing ships ranged far and wide, around India to the spice islands of the Indies, around Cape Horn to the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), to the northern shores of our continent, to Canton, to Formosa and to the Philippines. By Seward's time, Americans knew the Pacific. The United States government had participated in the opening of China to foreign trade and foreign missionaries and was preparing to send Commodore Matthew Perry to open Japan to the West.

It was after Seward's declaration, in the last half of the nineteenth century, that the United States acquired territory in the Pacific Ocean and truly became a Pacific power. To the Hawaiian Islands was added eastern Samoa, Wake, Midway and Guam islands and our largest Pacific Ocean territory, the Philippines. These acquisitions were made, partly by the accident of events elsewhere, but primarily to support expanding American interests in China, Japan and Korea. For it can be asserted that over the century and a half before Pearl Harbor, the United States

government and many, many Americans centered their interests in the central and northern Pacific, and in the area of northeast Asia adjacent to the Pacific—eastern China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. This gave a particular character and focus to United States policy until World War II.

In the south seas and the southwest Pacific were fabled islands plus the British territories of Australia and New Zealand. The whole of Southeast Asia and the great Indian subcontinent were known only to a few traders, businessmen, some tourists and a few missionaries before 1941. Americans were content to leave these vast regions to their European overlords, the British, French and Dutch. The equally huge reaches of Central Asia, so crucial in Sino-Russian relations, were virtually *terra incognita* to Americans.

Between 1852 and 1941, for a variety of well documented reasons, the American people and the United States government focused their main interest on China. It was what happened in China and what other nations were doing in and to China that was of primary concern. China's very size in population and in territory acted as a magnet, a lure to the United States, to all Western powers and to the Asian power, Japan. Americans thought they saw in China's hundreds of millions not only potential customers but potential converts to Christianity. American missionary, philanthropic and educational enterprises spread throughout China and attracted widespread support in the United States for their efforts.

But China and the Chinese proved to be frustrating to deal with. Feeling superior toward all other peoples, content with their age-old civilization, the Chinese resisted conversion and balked at modernizing their country on a Western model. Until the end of the nineteenth century, China was strong enough to resist much penetration by the West. After Japan defeated China in 1895 and until Mao Tse-Tung established the People's Republic, China was weak and disorganized, but she was too big to be divided by the powers and too big to be ignored.

CHANGING U.S. INTERESTS

It was World War II and the subsequent victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 that changed the character of United States Pacific interests and enlarged those interests to cover not only the whole Pacific Ocean area but most of the Asian continent. The scope and extent of World War II in the Asian-Pacific area and United States efforts to defeat Japan gave thousands of Americans a new knowledge of the southwest Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, the lands of Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. This new knowledge was quickly translated into a great expansion of American interests by the rapid dissolution of the colonial empires in Asia. Nearly a dozen new nations appeared on the map and the United States developed a variety of political and economic interests with them. The former Japanese-held island groups in the Western Pacific became a United States Trust Territory.

Equally, the victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland radically changed the character of United States interests and policy. China no longer offered a great potential for customers and converts; instead, China became a potential enemy of the United States. Since the start of the Korean War in June, 1950, and with the commitment of United States forces to South Vietnam, American interests across the Pacific and United States policy have demanded huge expenditures in time, money and lives. Yet in 1970, confronted by a host of pressing domestic problems, both the American people and the United States government are far more desirous of reducing commitments in the Asian-Pacific area than enlarging them, and of diminishing the heavy political-military involvements there. Thus President Richard Nixon's administration appears to be attempting to pursue what is being called a "low posture," "off-shore" strategy at the start of the 1970's. Two aspects of the future United States role in the Pacific area need examination. First, if the United States is a Pacific power, what are the components of that power? Second, what are the limitations on its exercise?

U.S. MILITARY POWER

The military component of United States power in the Pacific is well known. There is the United States Seventh Fleet with both conventional and nuclear weaponry. There are x number of Polaris submarines with nuclear missiles. There is the United States Air Force with its B-52 bombers, fighter and support aircraft and there are the nearly half-million United States troops in South Vietnam, plus 50,000 in Korea, and support forces on Okinawa, Guam and in Hawaii. The military capability of the United States as a Pacific power is formidable, indeed paramount, in the whole Pacific area. But military power must be matched and integrated with political and economic power. Here again, in the past two decades, the United States has been formidable.

The United States fought a costly war in Korea and helped reconstruct South Korea after the armistice. It managed the occupation of Japan and aided her postwar economy so successfully that the Japanese have engineered a place for themselves as the third greatest industrial state in the world. It has poured economic aid totaling many billions into the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, India and Pakistan.

AN ALLIANCE SYSTEM

Beginning in 1951, the United States began to forge a system of political-military alliances in the Asian-Pacific area to provide some security for the developing nations of the region and, by linking them to the United States, to ward off or contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression.¹ What value do these have for the 1970's? The United States alliance with South Korea arises from the peculiar nature of the Korean War; the United States represents the United Nations in holding the demilitarized zone under the armistice against attack from the North. The United States alliance with the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist regime on Taiwan arises from earlier commitments to his government

on the mainland and United States resistance to any Chinese Communist attack across the Formosa Straits. The United States alliance with the Philippines is the price we paid for the Japanese peace treaty and our attachment to the Philippines as a former colony that needed protection while it was getting on its feet as an independent state. The United States does not have a formal alliance with Thailand, but has declared it will help protect her independence and territory from outside aggression.

What have these states contributed to United States military-political power in the Pacific? Very little. The close relations with them are part of the responsibilities the United States has assumed as a Pacific power. These are uneasy alliances, necessary to the broad policy of preventing Chinese Communist aggression but hardly firm anchors against such aggression.

The key states in our alliance system are Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Australia and Japan are important industrialized states. All three share with the United States an interest in the future economic development and political stability of the Asian-Pacific area. These states are "alliance-worthy" and none lie on the continent of Asia; thus they are protected from the territorial embroilments and insurgencies that have plagued the Asian states since 1945. Thus the political-military power of the United States
(Continued on page 243)

William C. Johnstone taught political science at the George Washington University until 1946. There he also served as dean of the School of Government. He was director of U.S.I.S. for India during 1946-1947 and an adviser to the U.S. diplomatic mission to Nepal in 1947. He served in the Department of State until 1953. Mr. Johnstone is a lecturer at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute and a consultant to the RAND Corporation. Author of a number of works on Asian politics, his most recent publication is *Burma's Foreign Policy—A Study in Neutralism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

¹ See William C. Johnstone, "U.S. Military Commitments In Asia, 1969," *Current History*, August, 1969.

"The Philippines is the oldest continuously functioning independent democracy in East Asia, and one of the most stable of all the nations freed from colonial control after World War II. . . . Its accomplishments are considerable by the standards of many developing states, but its problems are also considerable, increasingly serious and growing in number."

The Philippines Under Marcos

BY RICHARD BUTWELL

Professor of Southeast Asian Politics, American University

IN 1971, THE Philippines will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary as an independent country, the oldest of the new nations emancipated from colonial rule after World War II.¹ The occasion will be celebrated soberly with a constitutional convention that could make some structural changes in Philippine government. Whether such changes will reach the heart of what seems to be holding back the country, however, is another matter.

The Filipino record in the nearly quarter of a century since the United States relinquished its colonial hold on the country is impressive in some respects—disappointing and depressing in others.² But both the accomplishments and the shortcomings are largely the result of attitudes and values that it will be difficult for the 1971 constitutional convention to alter.

Although large numbers of Filipinos are pessimistic about the future of their often violent country, the record in fact is one of the better ones among former Asian colonies.

¹One of the best overviews of Philippine historical development has been written by a distinguished Filipino scholar, O. D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

²A provocative article emphasizing the lack of accomplishment and the problems is John M. Mecklin's "The Philippines: an Ailing and Resentful Ally," *Fortune*, July, 1969.

³For a good analysis, see Quijano de Manila, "And Still Champ!" *Philippines Free Press*, November 22, 1969.

The November, 1969, presidential election, for example, was the seventh since World War II—the sixth since independence. The Philippines is the only independent state in Southeast Asia in which there has been a change of national leadership as a result of elections since World War II. Four times the "outs" have replaced the "ins" in control of the executive branch of Philippine government.

Critics claim that such changes have only been changes in personalities—that there is so little difference between the two major parties, the *Nacionalistas* and the Liberals, that the voters have no real choice in terms of issues or programs.

Party-switching, moreover, is a highly developed political art in the Philippines. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, reelected by an overwhelming margin in November, 1969,³ first gained his party's nomination as presidential challenger in 1964 by quitting the government party—of which he was Senate leader—and joining the opposition. He did so because incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal had promised not to seek a second term—and had gone back on his word. Senator Genaro Magsaysay, the opposition Liberal vice presidential candidate in 1969, left the government party only shortly before his nomination—as Marcos had done five years earlier.

So many Liberal politicians left their party

and reaffiliated with the *Nacionalistas* in 1969, in fact, that Vice President Fernando Lopez once—apparently unintentionally—addressed a gathering of Marcos followers as “fellow ex-Liberals.” Some of these politicians will ultimately return to the Liberal fold, especially if the Marcos star fades in the future. The Filipino political lexicon has a word for such political prodigals: “return-coats.”

This highly flexible system is often called a “one-and-a-half party” system or a “two-faction, one-party” system. This may be too negative a description of the prevailing party organization of the country. The two parties are admittedly differentiated primarily in terms of personalities rather than policies, but, like their United States counterparts, they also promise something to everyone—partly accounting for the similarity of their policies.⁴

The result, at least so far, has been one of Southeast Asia’s most stable political systems: one of a handful which has not suffered a coup (successful or otherwise), cancelled elections, or resorted to martial law. But this stability was probably purchased at the high price of genuine popular representation. Filipino political leaders are drawn almost wholly from a small upper class in whose interest they largely rule. The people vote, but men born into (and drawn from) the masses, on the whole, are not nominated for public office—locally or nationally—and the masses are not the main beneficiaries of the government’s policies.

It is questionable how the 1971 Philippine constitutional convention can deal with this problem of often less than enlightened self-interest. There are ways in which the structure of Philippine government could be improved—elimination of the 24-member Senate

(with its 24 nationally elected would-be Presidents) or replacement of the President’s present four-year term with a six-year term without the right of succession. The first proposed reform is highly desirable but very unlikely. The change in the length of the presidential term might be made, but this would not necessarily mean that future six-year Philippine Presidents would govern in the interest of all the people (or that there would be a dramatic decline in jockeying for the Presidency).

THE MARCOS PRESIDENCY

President Marcos,⁵ the first Filipino President ever to be reelected to a second term,⁶ probably did more for the people in his first term (1965–1969) than any previous Philippine chief executive. He built more roads and more schoolhouses—many more—than any of his predecessors. But the rich still grew richer and the condition of the poor remained about the same. The gap between the rich few and the many poor in the Philippines is probably greater than in any other Western Pacific country.

At his second inauguration in early 1970, reelected President Marcos pledged to divest himself of his personal wealth. It was a grand gesture—in the tradition of the renunciation of wealth that is often associated with many political and religious leaders in Asian lands. But skeptics were quick to call attention to the fact that the President’s wife, far wealthier in her own right, made no similar gesture.

Part of the Philippine political problem is the overwhelming preoccupation with narrowly defined politics. Far too much time and effort are spent on campaign activity and not enough is spent on political mobilization for the necessity of which Marcos spoke so eloquently in his first presidential bid in 1965. Former President Macapagal so neglected his duties in 1964–1965, while campaigning for reelection, that he disgusted many would-be supporters and thereby helped considerably in the successful Marcos opposition bid.

Traditionally, the Filipino voter has been so irritated with his President that he has re-

⁴ An excellent overview of the Philippine party system is provided by Carl H. Lande, “Party Politics in the Philippines,” in George M. Guthrie (ed.), *Six Perspectives on the Philippines* (Manila: Bookmark, 1968).

⁵ For a recent biography of Marcos, see Hartzell Spence, *Marcos of the Philippines* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

⁶ For an outstanding resume of the 1969 presidential campaign, see Napoleon G. Rama, “The Election Campaign in Review,” *Philippines Free Press*, November 15, 1969.

fused him a second term and voted for the opposition candidate, more in the spirit of rejection of the incumbent than of enthusiasm for the challenger. Marcos broke the second term jinx in 1969⁷ and he has a chance to prove that, freed from the task of courting reelection, a Filipino President can in fact improve the lot of his countrymen. If Marcos fails, however, disappointment and disillusionment may markedly increase and the revolution so many people fear (and openly talk about)⁸ may occur.

No Filipino President has ever faced the challenge—and the opportunity—facing President Marcos today. Marcos is not only the first reelected President, but he will also serve as chief executive at a particularly crucial time in Philippine history, when the country will hold a constitutional convention to consider the revision of its governmental structure. If the presidential term is changed, it is even conceivable that Marcos might try to be the first six-year President. In light of his two million-vote victory margin in 1969, it is not inconceivable that Marcos, already possessed of the largest legislative majority a Philippine President has ever enjoyed, could oversee the writing of his country's basic law in such a manner as to make this possible.

Such an eventuality, however, would not stabilize Philippine politics. Quite the opposite, in fact. It could split the country's elite right down the middle—for the wrong reason—as various would-be 1973 presidential aspirants saw their political ambitions going up in flames.

ACHIEVEMENTS—AND PROBLEMS

The Philippines is the oldest continuously functioning independent democracy in East

Asia, and one of the most stable of all the new nations freed from colonial control after World War II. It may well have more colleges and universities than any other new state. Its new city of Makati on the outskirts of Manila is as modern as any to be found in Europe or the United States. Philippine economic growth—greater than 6 per cent a year—is not unimpressive, but it is modified by its growing national population—the fastest growing in Asia.⁹

Its accomplishments are considerable by the standards of many developing states, but its problems are also considerable, increasingly serious, and growing in number. Large numbers of Filipinos migrate to the United States every year, seemingly fleeing from their beautiful and potentially pivotal country. These Filipinos, on the whole, are not of lower economic or social origin. They are often professionals, especially doctors and nurses.

The human loss due to migration is only one of several losses being sustained by today's troubled Philippines. There is also the monetary loss from smuggling—not the old-fashioned kind (with its midnight landings on lonely coasts, although this also takes place) but mainly so-called “technical smuggling” with its false customs declarations and bribed public officials. Some observers believe that there is proportionately more smuggling and related corruption of customs officials in the Philippines than in any other Asian land.

The reverberations of this corruption are felt throughout the economy and country. Infant industries whose development is in the interest of the whole nation are undercut to the profit of some selfish Filipinos. Badly needed revenues are denied the government. The bureaucracy—and the politicians who provide a protective screen for such dealings—are infected with a cancer-like disease that seems to be spreading. And the public, by no means unaware of such activities, loses faith in the government.

An unparalleled amount of more traditional types of crime—murder, robbery, rape, extortion, and the like—is also eating away at

⁷For an analysis of the reasons for the overwhelming Marcos victory in 1969, see the column of Nestor Mata in the *Philippines Herald* for November 13, 1969.

⁸The possibility of such a revolution, among other problems, is discussed in the DEPTHnews column of Juan L. Mercado in the *Manila Daily Bulletin* for November 12, 1969.

⁹The Philippine population is very well described in Juan L. Mercado's Philippine News Service feature story in the *Manila Daily Bulletin* for November 13, 1969.

the self-respect of the proud Philippine people. The Philippine murder rate is the highest in the world. The quantity of illegally possessed firearms is several times larger than the number of weapons officially issued to the armed services and the police. Frequently, moreover, the police themselves may be the perpetrators of crimes. More than one-third of the 2,800 policemen in Manila were under investigation in 1968 for misconduct ranging from graft to murder.

More often than not, it is the poor people of the Philippines, a majority of the population, who suffer from the abuses of police power and the loss of public revenues due to smuggling and other corruption; often they cannot obtain from the law the protection that is legally their due. A good example is the plight of the poor sugar plantation workers on the island of Negros in the Visayan, or middle, islands of the Philippines. The greedier of sugar plantation owners pay their workers only one-fourth of the minimum wage required by the law but report full payment for tax purposes.

A COMMUNIST REVIVAL¹⁰

It is this kind of condition that accounts for the apparently spreading Hukbalahap, or Communist, threat in the Philippines. The Huks, survivors of the wartime resistance movement that seriously threatened the Philippine government in the late 1940's, have always retained their base and considerable political influence in crowded Pampanga province in central Luzon. There they have often provided a crude kind of justice that government officials were unable or unwilling to provide.

In 1969, there were indications that the Huks were extending their operations to Negros island in the Visayas. The fragmented geographical makeup of the Philip-

pines and the heretofore split Communist leadership have hindered Huk expansion to other parts of the island nation in the past. But the spirit of revolution is clearly abroad in the islands and could well overcome such physical and personal obstacles in the years to come. The question is whether President Marcos and the other democratic politicians can lead the revolution or whether the Communists will come to monopolize the resistance to the forces of reaction and greed, as they have done in other lands.

The politicians have concerned themselves in the past mainly with getting elected (or reelected), which is another of the not-so-hidden costs of post-colonial Philippine development. Filipino elections are probably the costliest per capita in all Asia. The cost to the country in man-hours spent electioneering is virtually incalculable. Former President Macapagal spent so much time pursuing reelection in 1964–1965 that he literally did not have time to sign documents authorizing the use of vitally needed foreign aid funds.

Senators Sergio Osmena, Jr., and Genaro Magsaysay, Liberal presidential and vice presidential contenders in 1969, were politicians of the old school. Osmena, convicted wartime collaborator with Japan, was not an outstanding legislator, while Magsaysay—picked by Osmena to be his running-mate for the drawing power of the Kennedy-like appeal of the Magsaysay name—probably committed himself on fewer issues than any other living Filipino politician.

It is premature to call Marcos a new kind of political leader, let alone a revolutionary or even a real reformer. He became President in the first instance as a result of clever manipulation of the politics of the old school. In the 1969 election contest he was an indefatigable campaigner.¹¹ He is very much a politician—which is one reason he won in 1969.

The other reason was the faith of enough of his fellow Filipinos in him.¹² The Philippines did not change all that much during the first Marcos term, but it did change in some ways directly attributable to the leadership of the President. Much remains to be

¹⁰ For a good history and overview, see Jack D. Salmon, "The Huk Rebellion," *Solidarity* magazine (Manila), December, 1968.

¹¹ See Quijano de Manila, "Winding It Up," *Philippines Free Press*, November 1, 1969.

¹² A good description of the voter's response is given by H. Q. Borromeo in his column in the *Philippines Herald* for November 13, 1969.

done—too much, some say—but the Filipino voter was willing in 1969 to give Marcos four more years in which to try to solve some of the country's complicated problems.

CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Philippine foreign policy will probably undergo greater change in the first half of the 1970's under President Marcos' leadership than during any comparable period since independence. These changes will involve revised defense and economic relations with the United States,¹³ new relations with the Communist countries, and closer ties with the other nations of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, political and military as well as economic.

The United States military presence in the Philippines could be reduced significantly in the early 1970's—as much as a result of the Nixon doctrine of self-reliance and a low United States profile in Asia as in response to mounting new nationalism in the Philippines. Fortunately, the desire for a lessened military role in East Asia, which so clearly characterizes President Richard Nixon's administration, seems to coincide in time with the wish of increasing numbers of Filipinos for greater military independence from the United States.¹⁴ Many Filipinos, in fact, believe the Americans have lost the war in Vietnam.

As a result of these converging influences, by the end of the second Marcos term the United States will probably retain in the Philippines only Clark Air Force Base, the biggest such United States installation outside the United States. Even this facility will be operated on a much reduced basis and possibly jointly with the Philippine government (as it is not now). There are those Americans, however, like United States Senate leader Mike Mansfield, who would like to see the United States leave all its bases in

Southeast Asia after the war ends in South Vietnam.

Negotiations between the two governments on the bases, due to begin in February, 1970, could be indicative of the future defense relationship between the countries. In this sense, 1970 could be the most decisive year in the complicated continuing relationship between the ex-metropolitan power and its former colony since independence.

The bargaining during these years between the two states respecting their future relationship will also be decisive, although its implications for the broader Western Pacific region will be less profound. "Parity"—equal investment opportunities for Americans with Filipinos in the Philippines—will end in 1974. The United States has already indicated that it is not interested in the continuation of parity after 1974, but it does expect property rights acquired between 1946 and 1974 to be honored. In addition, the United States is not interested in perpetuating the preferential tariff access of Philippine products to its domestic market.

Filipinos, however, want continued preferential access to the United States market as well as maintenance of their share of the lucrative United States sugar quota with its higher-than-international prices. But many Filipinos do not want to allow Americans to continue to possess properties acquired under "parity" after 1974.

For individual Americans and United States companies the stakes are not small. For the Philippine government, however, the stakes are high indeed. A country that sought to borrow in late 1969 against its 1970 \$150-million United States bases rent is not a country that is on a firm financial footing.

Already Japan has overtaken the United States as the chief source of Philippine imports, and the Philippines' balance of trade with Japan is a deficit one—itsself balanced only by the trade surplus with the United States because of preferential access to the big American market and the sugar quota.

Mutual recognition by the Soviet and Philippine governments can be expected before the second Marcos administration is

¹³ The standard study of U.S.-Filipino relations is George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York, Praeger, 1964).

¹⁴ For a Filipino point of view, see Senator Jose W. Diokno's "The Issue with Americans," in *Solidarity* magazine (Manila), October, 1968.

much advanced. Trade with the U.S.S.R. and other East European countries has immensely benefitted both Malaysia and Singapore with no adverse political or other consequences. President Marcos and his astute Foreign Secretary, Carlos P. Romulo, see no reason why the once anti-Communist Filipinos should not trade, or otherwise deal, with Communist countries if it is to their advantage to do so.

Whether President Marcos recognizes China will depend on Peking's attitude and behavior in the immediate future. Marcos has already publicly hinted at the possibility of the recognition of the Peking regime¹⁵ and will probably probe the possibility of relations between the two governments, particularly if some other anti-Communist country such as Thailand takes the lead and exchanges emissaries with Peking.

ASIAN AND PACIFIC RELATIONS

The most important element of evolving Philippine foreign policy, however, may not be future relations with the Soviet Union or China or even the United States. China cannot help but be important in the long run for the Philippines, possessing as she does a population bigger than all the other East Asian lands together. But, given the threat that China potentially poses, the Philippines' relations with the other nations of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia are of major immediate importance as part of the broader strategic picture.

Philippine relations with other Asian and Western Pacific countries take three forms: bilateral, Southeast Asian, and East Asian-Western Pacific. Having resumed relations in late 1969 with Malaysia (ruptured as a result of the Sabah quarrel between the two countries), Manila now has direct diplomatic ties with 13 countries in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea are the only exceptions.

Within the region of Southeast Asia itself, the Philippines takes part in several regional

consultative patterns such as the annual meetings of the finance and development ministers of the region. Manila is also a member, but no longer an enthusiastic one, of SEATO, to which Thailand also belongs. Together with Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the Philippines is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

ASEAN was founded in 1967 for avowedly economic and cultural purposes. If there is a regional body in being that could evolve into a successor to SEATO as a regional peace-keeping instrument, it is probably ASEAN. Surprisingly (in view of Philippine membership in SEATO, founded as a result of a 1954 conference in Manila), the Marcos administration appears less enthusiastic about a new regional defense grouping than Malaysia, Singapore or Thailand (but is more inclined towards such a development than Indonesia).

Geography, however, has made the Philippines a Pacific outpost of Southeast Asia and, simultaneously, part of the string of peninsular and non-continental countries that lie along the eastern extremities of China and to the south of the Asian mainland. Two of Manila's ASEAN allies as well as all the rest of the non-Communist states of East Asia and the Western Pacific—from Japan to Australia and New Zealand—also belong to the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), created in 1966.

The Philippines is thus a member of the two most promising Asian non-Communist
(Continued on page 244)

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¹⁵ *The New York Times*, November 2, 1968.

"Although the United States promise to return Okinawa has been a positive step toward ameliorating the mood of dissatisfaction in Japan, reversion alone by no means solves the problem which most progressives, countless teachers, many moderates, and even a number of conservatives and Christians regard as the source of considerable anxiety: United States military policies in Asia."

The U.S.-Japanese Treaty Crisis

BY ROBERT EPP

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JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS, magazines, radio and television broadcasts have been reminding the public for over 12 months that 1970 will be an important year for Japan. After June 23, 1970, the mutual security treaty with the United States—concluded in 1952 and revised in 1960—will continue in force unless, as Article X stipulates, "either Party . . . give[s] notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given."¹ Questions of self-defense and future relations with the United States and Asia will be reconsidered in 1970; decisions made in this year may determine Japan's role in East Asia for some years to come.

Intellectuals, university students, progressives and opposition forces in Japan promise to make the year impressive as well as important. They are prepared to resort to violence in order to call attention to the implications of Article X. Unless pressures are exerted on Eisako Sato's government, the treaty will be extended automatically, and automatic extension means indefinite involvement in the United States network of anti-Chinese and anti-Communist treaties. Japanese radicals stand for unilateral abrogation of the treaty

and seek to use this issue as a lever to force the government to end Japan's complicity in Washington's East Asian military policies.

The potential of this lever is so great that despite the promised return of Okinawa most observers, progressive or conservative, expect a repeat performance of demonstrations staged in 1960 to protest revision of the original 1952 security treaty. The crisis will be far more serious than it was in 1960 and it will last considerably longer. In fact, judging from the nature of the issues available to the opposition, it may be proper to speak of a potential crisis during the 1970's rather than during 1970 alone.

Japan's situation in the early months of 1970 differs in four essential ways from that of 1960. First, the nature of the targets which the opposition has chosen to attack is different. In 1960, the security treaty was revised and required ratification, thus providing "dissidents" and progressive forces with clear-cut targets: the parliamentary process of approving the treaty and the site of that process, the Diet building. During ratification, moreover, the then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi made certain tactical errors and indulged in what the opposition regarded as "high-handed and undemocratic maneuvers"; as a result, Kishi also became an object of criticism. But in late June, 1960, with "the treaty ratified and Kishi's resignation

¹ Quoted in George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 367.

plans announced, the inflamed public mood shifted abruptly from outrage to apathy."² Deprived of its targets, the opposition movement collapsed.

In 1970, by contrast, it seems unlikely that collapse can occur as precipitously. Automatic extension of the treaty after June 23, 1970, requires no parliamentary process, so Premier Eisaku Sato will have fewer opportunities to commit the kind of mistakes which made Kishi so unpopular in 1960. And Sato's successes (both the American decision of November, 1969, to return Okinawa and the party's December 27 victory in the 1969 general election³) will doubtlessly spur opposition forces to reorganize. They will have to reevaluate and redesign their strategy and restate their issues in order to capitalize on the widespread student turmoil, little of which existed in 1960.

THE OKINAWA ISSUE

Despite United States press accounts which describe the Sato-Nixon talks as having pulled "the sensitive rug of sovereignty out from under" anti-American elements in Japan,⁴ opposition forces have not been totally deprived of issues. "Outs" have ample room to snipe at Sato's fuzzy stand on permitting nuclear weapons on, or American troop movements from, Okinawa. Editorials in both the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* newspapers pointed out that the joint statement following the Premier's visit to Washington failed to clarify this issue. The *Asahi* lamented the statement's militaristic overtones—explicitly

² Packard, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

³ It would be incorrect to assume that either success is an indication of Sato's popularity; in fact, "the ruling party's actual vote total was one million lower than the previous lower house poll, despite one million more people casting ballots . . ."; David K. Willis, "Sato's Policies Continue," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 1969, p. 1.

⁴ Editorial, *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 26, 1969, p. 24.

⁵ Both editorials appeared November 23, 1969, p. 5; on the same day similar sentiments were expressed in popular first-page columns ("Tensei Jingo" in the *Asahi* and "Yoroku" in the *Mainichi*). An unsigned *Pravda* editorial, December 16, 1969, described the Nixon-Sato talks as "a new military-political alliance between the United States and Japan . . . which is openly aggressive in nature"; the editorial is quoted in Charlotte Salkowski, "Soviets Warn Japan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 19, 1969, p. 2.

the United States insistence on access to Okinawa in the event of an "emergency." Given United States involvement in Asia, the possibility of an emergency is great, the editorial continued, and thus it is not entirely encouraging to be assured that there will be no nuclear weapons on Okinawa *at the moment* of its return. The important question of maintaining Japanese sovereignty over the island remains.

A *Mainichi* editorial expressed similar concerns. Emphasizing the positive side and rejoicing over Premier Sato's success in securing the early return of a "nuclear-free Okinawa," the *Mainichi* nevertheless called attention to the possibility that in an emergency the United States might petition the Japanese government to allow Okinawa's use as a staging area for military activities in Asia. The nub of the problem is that Washington sees Okinawa as the keystone of United States security in the Pacific. After reversion, the editorial wondered, what is to prevent the United States Defense Department from seeing all the Japanese islands as necessary to the United States defense perimeter? These unresolved problems continue to cause the Japanese grave concern.⁵

Other issues are provided by the intricate social and economic problems which will doubtlessly affect Okinawa over the next several years. In prewar days, people from the Ryukyu Islands were "second-class" citizens for whom Okinawa's economy failed to provide sufficient food. Despite postwar United States economic activities, observers do not think that the situation has improved. They suggest that Okinawa's "military base economy" accounts for a disproportionately large percentage of its income and prosperity, and that reversion to Japanese rule and a reduction in United States military spending will necessarily result in several years of painful adjustment for those who remain on the island. During those years the opposition will continue to have solid issues on which to attack the Liberal Democratic party (L.D.P.) for its entanglement in the United States security network.

Distant Okinawa may be beyond the daily

experience of average Japanese citizens. Nearby United States bases are not. They are, in fact, remarkably visible, for with few exceptions the 147 Yankee installations in Japan are in or near heavily populated areas. While only about a dozen can be classified as bona fide bases (many are dwelling units, storage facilities, hospitals and so forth), they are constant thorns in the side. The roughly 41,000 troops who man these installations bring some profit into contiguous areas. But they also cause considerable antagonism due to prostitution, antagonism which local associations, housewives and progressive writers never fail to exploit. And there are the inevitable incidents, e.g., a plane crash which takes a Japanese life or destroys Japanese property. Happily, accidents are infrequent. Constant noise from jets and other aircraft, however, presents another problem in areas as densely populated as urban Japan.

Plans are afoot to reduce the United States military presence. But the return of Okinawa and the possibility that the United States may substantially reduce its activities in Vietnam will not obviate the need for several major bases on Japanese soil. One factor behind the need for bases is that Sato hopes to keep down military expenditures by reliance on the United States nuclear umbrella; a second is that he has acceded to Washington's view that Korea's security is "essential" to Tokyo.⁶ Both facts suggest a long-range United States military presence.

Paradoxical attitudes toward rearmament constitute a third factor. On the one hand, the government is deterred from developing Japan's defense capabilities because L.D.P. leaders, basing their platform on continued prosperity, are inhibited from devoting as great a percentage of the gross national product to rearmament as many would like. On

the other hand, the Japanese people are as opposed to rearmament as to the United States bases which ostensibly make it safe to postpone full rearmament. Regarding the attitude to bases, one poll found that 83 per cent of the Japanese oppose United States military installations in Japan; another poll reported that 61 per cent believe "the continued presence of American bases is bad for Japan."⁷ And a poll completed in September, 1969, reported that 47 per cent of those questioned did not think that the United States would actually defend Japan in an emergency.⁸

As long as the Sato government fails to take an unequivocal stand against the American use of Okinawa, as long as bases exist on Japanese soil, and as long as popular opposition to rearmament continues, progressive forces and university students will have powerful levers with which to launch protest movements and move public opinion.

U.S. ASIAN POLICIES

The second major difference between 1960 and 1970 is a notable increase in the intensity and breadth of Japan's dissatisfaction with Washington's Asian policies. The shift in targets and issues described above is counterpointed by Japanese antagonism toward United States activities in Asia, stimulated particularly by the bombing of North Vietnam. To appreciate the sense of crisis which escalation of the war generated throughout Japan, we must recall that the Chinese successfully exploded their first atomic device a mere four months before American planes began making runs over North Vietnam. Communist China's entry into the nuclear club in October, 1964, and the escalation of the war in Vietnam after February, 1965, made the Japanese anxious. Many expressed the fear that, should China dispatch "volunteers" (as she did in 1950 during the Korean War), American bases in Japan could eventually become logical targets for Chinese nuclear retaliation.

True, the possibility of Chinese intervention is less a real than a psychological Damocles' sword, and both Vietnamization and

⁶ Stated by Sato in an English speech to the National Press Club (Washington), November 21, 1969.

⁷ From a poll conducted by Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., and described in *Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 1969, p. 2. The 83 per cent figure was reported in a poll which the Clean Government Party (Komeito) conducted in December, 1968, and reported in *Asahi Shimbun*, December 25, 1968, p. 2.

⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 1, 1969, p. 2.

the phased United States withdrawal from Vietnam appreciably lessen that possibility. Nevertheless, an amorphous and not entirely unfounded anxiety remains. Washington's anti-China stance makes many Japanese as fidgety as Americans were at the time of the Cuban missile crisis several years ago. After all, United States bases on Japan threaten China's security in the same way that Soviet missiles on Cuba were thought to have threatened United States security in October, 1962.

Dissatisfaction with Washington's Asian policies increases as people become sensitized to Japan's vulnerability. The EC-121 incident of April, 1969, when a United States reconnaissance plane was shot down over Chinese territory, reminds the Japanese that their nation is a party to anti-Communist activities. A typical conservative reaction was expressed by a 60-year-old, self-employed businessman in a letter to the editor of the *Asahi*: "The reason we Japanese were so shocked is that the reconnaissance plane flew from an airfield in Japan. While the plane is American, the base from which it originated is in Japan, so . . . this incident is extremely important to the Japanese people."⁹ Needless to say, radicals were far less restrained in their reactions.

Although the United States menace on China's periphery virtually guarantees further incidents, we might hope they will not be so serious as the U-2 crisis of May, 1960. This crisis not only abetted anti-government forces in their opposition to the ratification of the Japan-United States security treaty in June, 1960, but produced an unprecedented propaganda shock. Three weeks after the U-2 had been downed, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stated in a press conference, "We shall shoot these planes down; we shall administer shattering blows at the bases whence

they come and at those who have set up these bases. . . ."¹⁰

Immediately afterward, Soviet Defense Minister R. Y. Malinovsky ordered rocket installation commanders to retaliate against any violation of U.S.S.R. air space by striking at the base from which the overflight originated. Since a number of successful space shots had demonstrated Soviet rocket capabilities, and since most Japanese believed—despite Washington's denials—that U-2 pilot Francis Powers had flown from a base in Japan, the people were understandably shaken. They are also shaken each time China explodes another nuclear device. At every increase of tension in Asia, the Japanese are reminded that the security provided by American bases does not necessarily make their nation secure.

The mood of dissatisfaction with United States policy spills over into teaching materials designed for elementary school children. Radio broadcasts featuring discussions of current events for the upper grades consistently support the return of Okinawa and often cast American rule of the Ryukyu Islands in a bad light.¹¹ Moreover, the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyoso) has endorsed a rather strongly anti-American supplementary reader, *Our Okinawa (Watashitachi no Okinawa)*, to be used in the upper grades. Japanese teachers can be counted on to use this material despite disapproval by the Ministry of Education. Written by primary school teachers on Okinawa, the book describes the island's history and economy. But the B-52's which fly between Okinawa and Vietnam, the nuclear submarines which frequent Okinawan harbors, and the United States bases which dominate the island also get conspicuous booking.¹²

Even Japanese Christians have become critical of United States policies in Asia, a notable departure from their traditional apolitical attitude. The National Council of Churches of Japan sponsored a conference in mid-December, 1969, that explored such problems as Japanese security, United States-Japanese relations and Okinawa. A report prepared by scholars in attendance criticized the United States "military security mindset

⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 19, 1969, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, May 19, 1960; quoted in Robert North, et al., *Content Analysis* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 48.

¹¹ The discussion, led by Teruhiko Shimizu, is broadcast every Friday morning during the school year at 10:15 on NHK-2 (690AM) and titled, "Kono goro no dekgigoto [recent events]."

¹² Based on excerpts from the book in *Asahi Shimbun*, February 20, 1969, p. 4.

and preoccupation" in East Asia. Regarding Okinawa, the report asserted that "as Christians we should take a more definite attitude and positive steps towards the eliminating of all offensive weapons from Okinawa. And . . . we should work towards the ultimate goal of doing away with all such bases in Japan and Okinawa."¹³ In another context, a much more radical theological professor demanded that "the Mutual Security Pact . . . be destroyed and the campaign for national defense smashed."¹⁴

Although the United States promise to return Okinawa has been a positive step toward ameliorating the mood of dissatisfaction in Japan, reversion alone by no means solves the problem which most progressives, countless teachers, many moderates, and even a number of conservatives and Christians regard as the source of considerable anxiety: United States military policies in Asia.

GROWING NATIONALISM

The third difference between the situation in 1960 and that on the eve of the 1970's is the growing intensity of nationalism. There is no doubt that nationalism is the essential appeal of *Our Okinawa* and the prime mover of Japan's increased mood of opposition to United States policy in Asia. Few relish the thought of returning to the aggressive 1930's and 1940's, yet most Japanese desire a more positive affirmation of national interests, especially vis-à-vis the United States. That is reason enough for the growing criticism of Japan's role as an extension of United States policy. More and more thinking Japanese seem convinced that, by functioning as one of the primary instruments of Washington's policy in Asia, their country serves American, not Japanese, national interests.

Concern for Japanese national interests

increases every time United States military activities cause tension in the Far East. Thus the desire for peace welling up from the grass roots generally expresses itself as a demand for disengagement from the network of United States anti-Communist alliances and every symbol of that network. For example, there was tremendous popular opposition to the visit of the *U.S.S. Enterprise*, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which arrived at Sasebo in January, 1968. During that month the *Asahi* newspaper, with a national circulation of several million, received "8,163 letters (four times as many as . . . in an ordinary month) . . . among which 2,516 were concerned with the issue of the *Enterprise* alone."¹⁵

Not only are most Japanese "allergic" to anything nuclear, they also believe that warships like the *Enterprise* carry atomic weapons and so insist that the United States refrain from scheduling such visits to Japanese ports. Their main reasons are moral and practical. Morally, Japanese think that a nation opposed to atomic armaments is obliged to prohibit making, using or permitting such weapons to enter their country. Practically, they think it dangerous to allow nuclear warships to use Japanese ports, for—since the sole purpose of these ships is to "contain" China—their presence symbolizes a threat to the Peking government.

Concern for peace blends with the Japanese mood of opposition to Washington's Asian policies to cause a mushrooming of organizations dedicated to opposing the war in Vietnam. The efflorescence of voluntary groups represents an important new phase in the development of grass-roots Japanese democracy, one positive if unanticipated result of United States activities in Asia. Many such organizations have been formed by housewives who devote some of their newly-found leisure to the peace movement. The prosperity which creates leisure depends on Japan's continued peaceful economic growth, and these women believe that allowing the United States to conduct military operations from Japanese soil threatens that growth. The women put their convictions into prac-

¹³ *Japan Christian Activity News*, No. 357 (December 19, 1969), p. 4.

¹⁴ Toshiakazu Takao, "An Alliance of Egoists: Student Resistance at the Christian Universities," translated by Cyril Powles, *The Japan Christian Quarterly*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (Fall, 1969), 232.

¹⁵ Takeshi Ishida, "Emerging or Eclipsing Citizenship? A Study of Changes in Political Attitudes on Postwar Japan," *The Developing Economies*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (December, 1968), 421.

tice: "On June 15, 1968, more than two hundred civic groups organized rallies in various cities to protest against the war in Vietnam and thousands of persons participated in Tokyo,"¹⁶ many of them mobilized by housewives.

THE EXPANDING ECONOMY

Increased concern to assert national interests stems in part from Japan's expanding economic power. Of course, expansion itself has created the booming consumer market whose appliances and supermarkets supply urban and suburban housewives with the leisure to form the organizations mentioned above. The boom has also made businessmen more concerned than at any time since 1945 with Japan's role in international politics. Since about 1961, interested businessmen have been advocating nationalism, which one scholar describes as "a principle which demands that Japan act independently in international economic competition." Practically speaking, it can be boiled down to the desire to decrease our economic dependence on America.¹⁷ This desire has resulted in demands for structural reform of the Japanese business world in order to strengthen the economy over and against Yankee competition.

Reformists have every right to be concerned about such competition because "Japan's biggest electrical manufacturers, Hitachi and Tokyo Shibaura, are entering the billion dollar class, but they remain hardly a quarter to a fifth of General Electric in size," and Japanese corporations are weaker than comparable American firms since they "rely on borrowed funds for as much as 72 per cent of their entire capital. . . ."¹⁸

Structural reformists who wish to overcome

some of the disadvantages which their firms experience in the international market advise extensive changes in and rationalization of the Japanese business world. One form of rationalization, the merger, is being carried out so widely that some observers have called the 1960's an "age of amalgamations." Furthermore, reformists believe that "businessmen should take the initiative in defining long-range national political goals and in formulating government policies appropriate to achieve them."¹⁹ The wish for a competitive edge against Leviathan is understandable in view of the Japanese economy's utter dependence on trade; 80 per cent of Japan's industrial raw materials and 20 per cent of her foodstuffs are imported. Japan is thus exceedingly vulnerable to world trade and the good will of other trading nations. That is one reason Japanese businessmen object so heatedly to Washington's injunction on trading "strategic materials" with the Communist bloc.

Ironically, the same businessmen are usually reluctant to take unilateral action in defiance of this injunction because, after all, the United States buys nearly 30 per cent of all Japanese exports and sells Japan about 30 per cent of her imports. It is difficult for businessmen to make an issue of this point when they profit directly by a \$1.5-billion balance derived from the \$8-billion volume of trade Japan conducted with the United States in 1969. Yet the mere fact of dependence, even if it means prosperity, irritates the nationalistic spirit.

The close relationship between trade and diplomacy has made structural reformists as concerned with political problems as with rationalization. Their antipathy against the made-in-Washington label on Japanese foreign policy sparks a demand for increased Japanese autonomy and for more attention to Japanese, rather than American, national interests. Businessmen, like housewives and intellectuals, combine nationalistic sentiment with the desire for peace and oppose what they describe as "America's dangerous Asian policy"; the opposition's attitude "comprises two different factors operating together—the

¹⁶ Ishida, *loc. cit.*

¹⁷ Yuichiro Noguchi, "Economic Nationalism," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (August, 1966), 95.

¹⁸ William W. Lockwood, "Political Economy," in Herbert Passin, ed., *The United States and Japan* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 124.

¹⁹ Yuichiro Noguchi, "Trends in Thought among Structural Reformists in Japanese Industry," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. V, No. 1 (April, 1967), 12.

factor of national pride, and [that of] aversion to involvement in war as a result of military alliance with the United States."²⁰ Thus the Japanese have naturally moved toward criticizing an essential reason for that alliance: the United States policy of containing and isolating China.

The fourth difference between 1960 and 1970 is an increasing demand that Japan disengage herself from the United States network of alliances against China. The primary reason for vicious opposition to the 1965 treaty which the Sato government concluded with General Chung Hee Park's regime in South Korea is that progressives see the treaty as a link in the United States chain of security arrangements in East Asia. The demand that Japan desist from making such treaties is heightened by the complaint that Washington's Far Eastern policy constitutes a serious barrier to Japan's diplomatic and economic leadership in Asia. Conservatives have also begun to speak out on this issue. For example, an official who served in an earlier Sato Cabinet opposes the United States stance because "China's ignorance of the outside world is part of the reason for her inflexible foreign policy," and American actions only increase China's isolation and inflexibility.²¹ Moreover, a substantial faction within the L.D.P. led by Takeo Miki (who now controls 39 as opposed to Sato's 59 of the party's 300 seats) opposes support of Washington's anti-Peking posture and supports closer relations with mainland China.²²

If it is true that Washington's diplomatic,

military, and economic measures against China increase tension in East Asia, the same measures will doubtlessly continue to stimulate both Japanese nationalism and opposition to the symbols of that policy: Okinawa as a springboard for United States military activities in Asia and United States bases in Japan. [It is worth remembering that not a few Japanese believe it is because "Washington has hemmed in China by nuclear intimidation . . . [that she] has been forced into a program of nuclear development."²³

Japanese government officials and intellectuals are not alone in suggesting an overhaul of Washington's China policy. American scholars and politicians from both parties have been making similar statements. Recently, two senators—Edward M. Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts, and John S. Cooper, a Republican from Kentucky—have said that a reevaluation of United States policy toward China is long overdue.²⁴ The interest shown by these senators is rooted in a concern for peace and in the belated realization that peace in Asia is impossible without cooperation from the People's Republic of China. The next step is to recognize that United States policy itself produces much tension and anti-American sentiment in Asia and Japan.

These differences between the situation in 1960 and 1970 suggest that United States-Japanese relations face a crisis far more serious than they faced a decade ago. Even if the Nixon government returns Okinawa on schedule, and even if the Defense Department should transfer every United States base in Japan to South Korea and Taiwan, a genuine solution awaits the day when leaders in Washington develop a more positive China policy and make a determined attempt to relax tensions in East Asia. Until then, the moralistic, anti-Communist presence of the

(Continued on page 243)

²⁰ Takeshi Ishida, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Present Aspects and Future Outlook," *Annals of the Institute of Social Science*, Tokyo University, No. 9 (1968), p. 33.

²¹ Kiichi Miyazawa, "Proposals for Improving Japanese-American Relations," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (August, 1966), 51.

²² Frank Langdon, "Japan: Multi-party Drift and Okinawa Reversion," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January, 1969), 46.

²³ Hiroharu Seki, "Systems of Power Balance and the Preservation of Peace," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, Vol. V, No. 1 (April, 1967), 54.

²⁴ See the section "Reassessing U.S. Policy on China," *The New Leader*, March 3, 1969, pp. 12-16, for brief articles on the China problem by Kennedy and Cooper.

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"In brief, the two Koreas are vigorously pursuing the same goals—unity and change—and yet their ultimate aims are poles apart. The North seeks unity under Red banners, while the South strives for unity free from Communist influence."

The Two Koreas

BY B. C. KOH

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IF THERE IS to be another war in Asia in which the United States may find itself entangled, however grudgingly, it is most likely to be waged in the Korean peninsula. The events of the last few years—particularly the *Pueblo* incident of January, 1968, and the EC-121 incident of January, 1969—have made plain not only the bellicosity of North Korea but also the alarming possibility that provocative acts by a hostile power, no matter how small, may easily spark a new land war in Asia that none of the major Pacific powers seems to want.

The roots of the Korean tragedy—which has thus far claimed a heavy toll in human lives and suffering, including some 33,000 American lives—go back to the partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945. Following the Allied victory over Japan in World War II, Korea, which had been ruled by Japan for 35 years, was occupied by United States and Soviet troops, respectively. Originally intended as a temporary measure aimed at disarming Japanese troops and maintaining order pending a more enduring political solution, the occupation divided the country into two zones, with the 38th Parallel as a demarcation line. The Soviet troops took the northern half, while the United States occupied the southern half.

Failure to reach an agreement on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union on how to constitute a political structure in Korea, however, soon transformed the "temporary" division into a permanent partition. Three years after the occupation forces entered Korea, two rival regimes emerged, each claiming sole legitimacy and embodying diametrically opposed ideologies.

NORTH KOREAN POLITICS

The government that came into being in the Soviet zone in September, 1948, was unmistakably Communist and Soviet-oriented. It was headed by Kim Il-sŏng, a 36-year-old former leader of anti-Japanese partisans in Manchuria, who had firmly consolidated his political power through a series of maneuvers during the three years preceding the formal proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.). Among the strategic factors aiding his rise to power were the apparent Soviet backing and, perhaps more important, the absence of veteran Korean Communists with national reputation—such as Pak Hŏn-yŏng—in the North Korean political arena at the crucial stage. The latter had made the fatal mistake of initially choosing the American zone, where the prospect of Communist ascendancy was nonexistent, as their arena of political action.¹ When the Korean Communists belatedly rushed to the North, Kim's position had al-

¹ See Dae-Sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

ready become unassailable. After being briefly co-opted by Kim, Pak and his colleagues were obliterated in the blood bath that followed the Korean armistice.

Other individuals or groups that posed (or were perceived by Kim as posing) even the slightest challenge to his leadership were also eliminated from the political arena, although their lives were often spared. These included the Soviet-Korean faction and the Yen-an faction. As a result, political control in present-day North Korea is in the grip of Kim Il-sŏng and his former colleagues in the anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns, who monopolize all the key positions in the Korean Workers' Party (K.W.P.), the government and the military.

Kim's principal technique of political control is ideological indoctrination backed by a formidable reservoir of coercive power. Eager to enlist the active support of the North Korean masses, Kim strives to legitimize his leadership by ceaselessly flaunting his putative sagacity and greatness. Voluminous works have been produced by and about Kim on the various aspects of the "Korean revolution" with particular emphasis on the pivotal role allegedly played by Kim; these works are required reading for his people.

The manifest goals of North Korea constitute the very themes of Kim's "revolutionary thought." They are (1) *chuch'e* (autonomy or self-identity) in thought, (2) political independence, (3) economic independence, and (4) self-reliance in national defense.²

The accent on autonomy, however, cannot be permitted to undermine Kim's monolithic

political control. To "think with one's own head" does not mean that North Koreans may criticize Kim's "revolutionary thought." The latter demands nothing less than blind acceptance and abject approbation. Many a top ranking associate of Kim in the party or the government has been replaced for voicing views different from Kim's "revolutionary thought." Often such a person is also made a scapegoat for an embarrassing policy failure.³ South Korean intelligence sources claim that nearly one-third of the North Korean population was relocated in "backwoods areas" and assigned to forced labor in the early 1960's on the suspicion of possible ideological deviation and that a thorough loyalty check of the entire population was made between April, 1966, and March, 1967, for the purpose of ferreting out "unreliable elements" on the basis of their social origins.⁴

NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY

Apart from the perpetuation of his political control over North Korea through ideological remolding and physical coercion, both latent and manifest, Kim's major preoccupations over the past two decades have been economic development and national reunification. His formula for economic development is borrowed from Joseph V. Stalin, his political mentor. It involves the implementation of a series of multi-year economic plans aimed at building a predominantly industrial but self-reliant economy. Agriculture has been completely collectivized.

Thanks to a combination of factors, North Korea has made impressive headway in her industrialization program.⁵ She has been aided by (1) the existence of a skeletal industrial base inherited from the Japanese, (2) relatively abundant natural resources, (3) aid from the Communist bloc, particularly from Moscow and Peking, and (4) the efficiency with which the masses have been mobilized. Her latest and most ambitious economic plan, the seven year plan of 1961-1967, however, ran into difficulties. The apparent stumbling blocks included the precipitous decline in Soviet aid triggered by P'yŏngyang's ideological alliance with Peking

² See *Nodong Sinmun*, December 17, 1967. This is the daily organ of the K.W.P., published in P'yŏngyang.

³ For a list of Kim's former colleagues who have been purged in recent years, see *Tonga Ilbo*, January 5, 1970. Published in Seoul, this newspaper has the largest circulation in South Korea.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ The equivocal nature of North Korea's economic statistics, particularly the primary reliance on ratios rather than absolute figures, makes it difficult to assess the North Korean economy in specific terms. For a more detailed discussion, however, see B. C. Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 16-26.

and the straining of North Korea's limited human and material capabilities.

Kim sought to break the stalemate by patching up his differences with Moscow early in 1965, by streamlining leadership and management techniques in all sectors and at all levels of the economy, and by intensifying technical training and political indoctrination. The *Ch'öllima* (Flying Horse) Movement, modeled on Peking's Great Leap Forward, was stepped up. In 1966, the seven year plan was officially extended for three years on the pretext that a growing belligerency on the part of South Korea necessitated a diversion of North Korean resources to war preparedness.

P'YONGYANG'S FOREIGN POLICY

North Korea's foreign policy can be understood simply as a tenacious quest for her national goals which can be expressed in two phrases: unity and change or, alternatively, reunification and economic modernization. Spectacular economic progress in the North, he feels, is bound to impress the South Korean people, thus enhancing their desire for and, eventually, pressure for reunification. More important, the mounting threat of the South, in Kim's view, calls for a heightened vigilance and military capability on the part of the North. The latter in turn is a function of industrial capacity. Finally, North Korea's military and economic muscle can help to beef up the "revolutionary capacity" of the South Korean people, thus hastening the day when national unity will be finally won.

North Korea's policy toward South Korea, then, is synonymous with her reunification policy. The Korean War of 1950-1953 was manifestly an attempt to unify Korea by force. Failure of that venture led P'yöngyang to adopt a "peaceful" approach: it repeatedly challenged Seoul to the conference table, arguing that the problem of Korean reunification should be settled by the Koreans themselves free from external interference—that is, after all the United States troops withdraw from the South. P'yöngyang has flatly refused to recognize the authority of the

United Nations to deal with the Korean question on the ground that, as a co-belligerent in the Korean War, the latter cannot possibly be an impartial judge.

In August, 1960, Kim proposed a "confederation plan" under which the governments of the two Koreas would form a "Supreme National Council" for the purpose of coordinating cultural and economic intercourse. As a minimum step, he proposed a postal exchange program. These gestures were dismissed by Seoul as propaganda ploys.

North Korea coupled the "peaceful" approach with a growing campaign of infiltration, subversion and terrorism against the South. By late 1966, Kim appeared to have jettisoned any lingering hope for a negotiated settlement of the unification problem. A marked increase in the war preparation effort in the North was accompanied by a sudden escalation of violence in the South. North Korean-triggered incidents in the South increased ten-fold in 1967 over the previous year. The most stunning manifestation of P'yöngyang's heightened militancy came in January, 1968. A daring, though abortive, commando raid by a 31-man North Korean team in Seoul on January 21 was followed by the forcible seizure by North Korean patrol boats of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* with 83 men aboard in Wönsan Bay two days later.

To speculate about Kim's specific aims in seizing the United States naval intelligence vessel is to inquire into his overall posture toward the United States. Simply put, the posture could not be more hostile. Kim perceives the United States as the principal deterrent to his goal of reunification, depicts "U.S. imperialism" as the source not only of all of Korea's intractable problems but also of the suffering of the "oppressed people" the world over, and seeks to undermine it with all the resources at his disposal.

More than anything else, the *Pueblo* incident provided Kim with a rare opportunity to downgrade and humiliate his archenemy. Not only did it expose in a spectacular fashion the vulnerability of American power, but it also demonstrated, in Kim's view, the capacity of North Korea to wage a "heroic

struggle" against the "leader of the imperialist camp." Additionally, Kim offered the spy ship, its documents, its crew, and their "confessions" to his countrymen and allies alike as proof that the United States and South Korea were preparing for an invasion of the North. He exhorted his people, already laboring under the crushing burden of long hours of work, interminable political study sessions, and militia training, to redouble their efforts. It is also possible that Kim may have pressed for more Soviet aid in the wake of the *Pueblo* seizure.

The downing of the EC-121 naval reconnaissance plane in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969, can be interpreted in the same vein. It was simply another attempt by North Korea to humiliate the United States and to reap propaganda benefits. One possibility that should not be ruled out, however, is that P'yongyang may have hoped to provoke a United States retaliation and then to seize the opportunity to precipitate an all-out war. Such a scenario, had it materialized, would have posed a major dilemma to the Soviet Union, which is not only bound by a treaty to help defend North Korea's security but has actually helped to modernize North Korea's armed forces in recent years.

PEKING AND MOSCOW

North Korea's relations with Communist China cannot be considered apart from the former's ties with the Soviet Union. For the Sino-Soviet conflict has added a new dimension to the situation. With both the Communist giants North Korea has inseparable bonds—political, economic, military, cultural, and geographic. Without Chinese and Soviet support she could not have remained a politically and economically viable nation.

P'yongyang's oscillation between Peking and Moscow, then, is consistent with North Korea's perceived self-interest. After an initial period of fence-straddling, she sided with Peking in the period 1962–1964. Nevertheless, a balance sheet of her gains and losses

in this period appears to have resulted in the decision to seek a rapprochement with Moscow. The consequent resumption of Soviet aid to P'yongyang has had a marked impact on the latter's twin programs of economic and national defense construction. Apart from the reinvigoration of the economy, North Korea's defense apparatus has been fortified with modern Soviet arms.⁶

It should be noted that the renewal of Soviet-North Korean friendship has entailed neither a mellowing of North Korean belligerency toward the United States and South Korea nor her subservience to the dictates of Moscow. Beginning with the celebrated *Nodong Sinmun* editorial of August 12, 1966, North Korea has repeatedly asserted her independence of both Peking and Moscow and has even ventured veiled criticisms of both.

North Korea's relations with the other major power in Asia, Japan, have been rather tenuous. Measured against the yardstick of P'yongyang's self-interest, Japan is an exceedingly important nation. As the world's third industrial power, Japan is an ideal trading partner and, more important, a potential supplier of industrial machinery to North Korea. Furthermore, the existence of a sizable number of Korean residents and a legitimate Communist party in Japan makes the latter a convenient base of operations for North Korean propaganda, espionage and infiltration activities directed against South Korea.

The continued ascendancy of conservative politicians in Tokyo with their markedly pro-United States orientation, reinforced by Japan's indispensable economic and military ties with Washington, has effectively precluded the development of amicable relations between P'yongyang and Tokyo. In keeping with Tokyo's policy of separating economics from politics, however, trade on a modest scale has developed between the two countries since 1956. In 1959, North Korea scored a significant propaganda victory by inducing Japan to conclude a nongovernmental agreement that allowed the repatriation of Korean residents to North Korea. More than 88,000 of the estimated 600,000 Koreans in Japan have since gone to North

⁶ For an estimate of the number and variety of Soviet-supplied weapons and facilities in North Korea, see *The New York Times*, February 1, 1968.

Korea under this unofficial understanding.

Since the conclusion of the normalization treaty between Japan and South Korea in late 1965, North Korea has become markedly hostile to the Japanese government and has steadily escalated her diatribes against what she views as the resurgence of Japanese militarism. She has also charged that Japan is attempting to subjugate Korea again through economic infiltration.

As might be expected, North Korea is solidly behind Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) and has vigorously condemned the "U.S. aggression" in Vietnam. Enraged by South Korea's decision to send 50,000 troops to Vietnam to become "cannon fodder for U.S. imperialism," North Korea has made a standing offer to send her own "volunteers" to help Hanoi and the N.L.F. any time. She is believed to have provided economic and military assistance, including an estimated 20 jet pilots whose main responsibility appears to be the training of North Vietnamese pilots.⁷

SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS

The record of South Korean politics over the past two decades is a turbulent one indeed. An offshoot of U.N.-supervised elections, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally proclaimed in August, 1948. Although boasting an institutional apparatus patterned after the Anglo-American model of democracy, the ROK government in fact took on a patently autocratic complexion. Its first President, Syngman Rhee, consistently made a mockery of democracy by stifling dissent and by persecuting and sometimes exterminating his political opponents. Among his most notorious acts were the passage of two constitutional amendments in 1952 and 1954, through the tactics of intimidation, coercion, and fraud (both were designed to perpetuate his one-man rule) and the wholesale

rigging of elections in 1960. The latter touched off nationwide protest demonstrations led by students, putting an end to Rhee's 12-year reign.

The ensuing twelve-and-a-half-month period, first under Acting President Huh Chung and then under Premier John M. Chang, saw the blossoming of political liberty. For the first time in Korean history, South Koreans enjoyed freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration, free elections, and freedom from fear. In fact, freedom tended to verge on license, undermining the efficacy of government. To make matters worse, the Chang regime was plagued by factionalism, ineffective leadership and mounting economic problems. In May, 1961, a military coup d'état toppled the regime, ushering in an era of military rule.

Although civilian rule was nominally restored in late 1963 following elections for the President and the National Assembly, the coup leaders, in civilian garb, retained political control. General Park Chung Hee, head of the military junta, narrowly won the Presidency,⁸ while the Democratic-Republican Party (D.R.P.), the newly organized political arm of the coup leaders, won 110 seats out of 175 in the Assembly.

In May, 1967, President Park won his second term by polling 51.4 per cent of the valid votes cast. In the Assembly elections held a month later, the ruling D.R.P. won 130 seats. However, the elections were marred by widespread irregularities, and under the vigorous protests of the opposition New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) and students, the D.R.P. refused to seat seven of its own elected members in the Assembly and expelled many persons from the party on charges of improper conduct.

What may go down as the most bitterly fought political battle in South Korea's history occurred in 1969. At issue was a proposed constitutional amendment that would allow President Park to run for a third term in 1971. While the active advocates of the measure initially included only the members of Park's inner circle, its opponents encompassed not only the N.D.P. but some 20 mem-

⁷ *Tonga Ilbo*, September 18, 1967.

⁸ Although Park polled only 47 per cent of the valid votes cast, the failure of the opposition politicians to unite behind a single candidate ensured Park's election. See C. I. Eugene Kim, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections," *Asian Survey*, vol. 4 (March, 1964), pp. 765-773.

bers of the D.R.P. in the Assembly. The latter belonged to the so-called "old main current" faction led by Kim Jong Pil, the principal architect of both the 1961 coup and the D.R.P. and a nephew-in-law of President Park.

Since the Kim faction held the balance in the Assembly, the pro-amendment forces waged an intensive campaign to win the former's support. Then, faced with the last-ditch obstructionist tactics of the N.D.P. Assemblymen, who had forcibly occupied the rostrum of the main Assembly hall, the D.R.P. on September 14 held a secret midnight session of the Assembly in a heavily guarded annex building and "unanimously" passed the measure. All told, 107 D.R.P. and 15 independent Assemblymen participated in the unilateral action.

No less controversial was the manner in which the national referendum on the amendment was conducted. Simply stated, all the resources of the D.R.P.—particularly money and bureaucratic power—were mobilized to drum up support for the measure and to emasculate the opposition forces. On October 17, 1969, amid widespread charges of vote rigging, vote buying and other irregularities, the measure was approved by an overwhelming margin—65.1 per cent of the valid votes cast. Four days later, Park announced a major reshuffle of top government positions, of which the most significant feature was the replacement of two of his most influential aides—Yi Hu-rak, Chief Presidential Secretary, and Kim Hyŏng-uk, director of the powerful Central Intelligence Agency which functions primarily as a secret police. Although their replacement may have been a quid pro quo for the Kim faction's support of the amendment (their ouster had been demanded by the faction), the latter's expected rejuvenation has thus far failed to materialize. In fact, its members were totally excluded from chairmanships of the

standing committees in the Assembly in the latest reshuffle.

Enraged by what it regarded as acts of majority tyranny, the N.D.P. boycotted the remaining Assembly session. Saddled with factionalism and enfeebled by the repressive tactics of the ruling power elite, the opposition party faces a bleak future. Unless and until President Park initiates and implements effective measures to liberalize his regime and to nurture responsible political dissent, a competitive party system, a sine qua non of democracy, is likely to remain more a rhetoric than a reality in South Korea.

SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY

If South Korea has thus far failed to make any notable headway in political development, she has compiled an impressive record in economic development. According to Joe Won Lee, an experienced analyst of the Korean economy, there have been three stages of economic growth in South Korea since the armistice of 1953: (1) the reconstruction stage from 1954 to 1957, (2) the stabilization stage from 1958 to 1961, and (3) the accelerated development stage from 1962 to date. The first stage saw a massive attempt to reconstruct the economy from the ashes of wartime destruction, encumbered by governmental corruption and incompetence and runaway inflation. In the second stage, the South Korean government made a vigorous effort to check inflation by raising taxes, reducing capital spending, eliminating budget deficits and tightening bank credit. As a result, prices were stabilized for the first time since the Korean War: the average annual rate of increase in wholesale prices declined from 42 to 5 per cent. This, however, was accomplished at the price of a slowdown in economic growth: the average annual rate of increase in real Gross National Product (G.N.P.) declined from 6 to 4 per cent.⁹

Against this background, the Park government formulated a five year economic development plan embodying an "unbalanced growth" approach and aimed at laying the groundwork for a "take-off" toward a sustained development. While adopting the

⁹ See Joe Won Lee, "Perspective for Economic Development and Planning in South Korea," in Andrew C. Nahm (ed.), *Studies in the Developmental Aspects of Korea* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Western Michigan University, 1969), pp. 30-56.

framework of "guided capitalism," the plan quickly switched its emphasis from guidance to capitalism, thus encouraging and relying heavily on the market mechanism. Aided by a combination of factors, the plan overfulfilled its targets, increasing South Korea's real G.N.P. at the average annual rate of 8.3 per cent.

With a second five year plan under way since 1967, the economy has kept up its momentum. The average annual growth rates in real G.N.P. for the last three years have been: 8.4 per cent (1967), 13.1 per cent (1968), and 15.5 per cent (1969). Per capita G.N.P. rose from \$94 in 1960 to \$195 in 1969, while the total value of export jumped from \$32.8 million in 1960 to about \$700 million in 1969. The export target for 1970 has been set at \$1 billion.

Among the factors contributing to the recent economic upsurge are (1) improved planning machinery, underpinned by refined statistical procedures, (2) a growing sense of confidence on the part of the Korean people, accompanied by increasing expertise and efforts, (3) the normalization of ROK-Japanese relations, (4) ROK participation in the Vietnam War, and (5) the inducement of foreign capital in the forms of loans and investment. Not to be overlooked is the cumulative effect of United States economic aid which amounted to more than \$3.6 billion in the period 1945-1968.

South Korea's impressive record of economic growth in recent years, however, is marred by the persistence or recurrence of a host of problems. They include (1) the steadily growing trade deficit, (2) too much reliance on foreign loans, a significant proportion of which are diverted from capital investment to non-productive channels (the high interest rates, both official and unofficial, encourage the latter practice), (3) the excessive reliance of export industries on imported raw material, (4) the mismanagement of funds due to corruption that has permeated

all levels of government, (5) inflation, and (6) inept and often regressive governmental policies. Despite notable gains, not only is the per capita G.N.P. depressingly low, but the gap between the rich few and the poor masses continues to widen. South Korea's traditionally impoverished peasants eke out a bare existence, insulated from the rewards of economic boom.

SEOUL'S FOREIGN POLICY

The ultimate goals of South Korea's foreign policy are no different from those of North Korea: unity and change or reunification and modernization. Nevertheless, P'yŏngyang perceives reunification in terms of the communization of the South, Seoul defines it as the merger of the two Koreas into one free and democratic nation. Given free all-Korean elections based on the "one-man, one-vote" principle and supervised by the U.N.—the only formula acceptable to Seoul—South Korea is confident that communism will fade away. Apart from the strong possibility that the present Kim Il-sŏng regime may lack genuine grass-roots support, the South outnumbers the North by more than two to one. No matter how disenchanted the South Korean people may be with the successive regimes in Seoul, their antipathy for communism is both patent and intense.

Seoul's posture toward the reunification problem and hence toward the North has been essentially defensive. Determined to deter North Korea from launching a full-scale invasion and alarmed by her growing truculence, South Korea has markedly fortified her defense capability with United States assistance. Since the *Pueblo* incident, the United States has strengthened the arsenal not only of its own 50,000 troops stationed in South Korea, but of the South Korean armed forces as well. With the third largest military establishment in the non-Communist world, South Korea has a 540,000-man army, a modest but well-trained navy, an air force equipped with more than 300 modern planes, including F-84's, F-86's, F-5's and F-4C Phantom jets, and, finally, a 2.5 million-member militia force.¹⁰

¹⁰ See Emerson Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47 (April, 1969), pp. 565-568. The number of the militia force, however, is based on *Tonga Yon'gam* [Tonga Yearbook], 1969 (Seoul: Tonga Ilbo-sa, 1969), p. 434.

While continuing to rely heavily on United States support, both actual and promised, South Korea is nevertheless making a concerted effort to become militarily self-reliant. The effort has taken on an added urgency since the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine which, while affirming the sanctity of Washington's treaty commitments, urges Asian nations to fend for themselves. Sensing a rising mood of "never again" in the United States, the South Koreans are wondering aloud if Washington's commitment to help defend South Korea, embodied in the ROK-United States mutual defense treaty, is as firm as they would like it to be. It is to be noted that Washington is in fact committed not to immediate action against North Korean aggression but to "immediate consultations" only.

Nevertheless, in a visit to Seoul in August, 1969, United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers declared: "One of my purposes for being here is to assure you that you should have no apprehensions. The United States and Korea have solemn treaty obligations and we have 50,000 men here. I hope it is clear to you that you should have no fears." Later in the same month, President Park flew to San Francisco for talks with President Richard Nixon, which resulted in a joint communiqué reaffirming the United States commitment. Nixon, however, stressed the need for self-reliance on South Korea's part. Under these circumstances, Park is anxious to couple economic construction with stepped-up military preparedness.

Seoul's policy toward Washington, then, is one of complete support and, for the foreseeable future, considerable dependence. The relations between the two capitals have improved markedly since October, 1965, when South Korea dispatched her troops to South Vietnam. The 50,000-man ROK contingent has since become the third largest on the Allied side after the South Vietnamese

(A.R.V.N.) and the United States forces. Aside from strengthening the international complexion of the Allied forces and measurably lightening the American burden, the ROK forces have also made a significant contribution to the South Korean economy. Their remittances to their families in South Korea totaled more than \$72 million during the first three years; military procurements for the troops from South Korea netted \$46 million in 1967 alone; and various civilian projects associated with the war effort in Vietnam brought an additional \$384 million as of June, 1968. Finally, South Korea believes that the battle experience gained by ROK troops will appreciably strengthen her defense posture against the North.¹¹

Given her fiercely anti-Communist orientation and the fact that the cherished goal of reunification was impeded by the intervention of Chinese Communist troops in the Korean War, South Korea can have only one policy toward China—a total rejection of the People's Republic of China accompanied by an ideological alliance with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. In fact, if Seoul had its way, it would form a multi-partite military alliance including both Taiwan and Japan. Its attempts to turn the nine-member Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), established at its initiative in Seoul in June, 1966, into such an alliance, however, have thus far been unsuccessful due in large part to Japan's opposition.

A significant milestone in South Korea's foreign policy is her success in normalizing relations with Japan in late 1965. Due to a deep-seated enmity stemming from the latter's 35-year colonial rule over Korea, it re-

(Continued on page 245)

¹¹ See *Tonga Yon'gam*, 1969, pp. 436-437. South Korea complains that its troops are the lowest paid among the Allied forces. The monthly salary of a ROK corporal—\$37.47—for example, is about half that of his A.R.V.N. counterpart. Most of the Allied troops are paid by the United States.

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Describing New Zealand's changing policies, this author declares that "The traditional norms have largely ceased to exist while the main lines of New Zealand's development in the 1970's are not clear. It is possible, for example, that even New Zealand's viability as an independent unit could be threatened because of her size and economic vulnerability."

New Zealand in the 1970's

BY W. KEITH JACKSON

DESPITE ITS GEOGRAPHICAL position, New Zealand has traditionally been a European-oriented nation. For much of the relatively short period of their inhabited existence the large isolated islands of New Zealand have been in the Pacific without being part of it. Even the original Polynesian inhabitants appear to have had no further contacts with the islands from whence they came and developed a characteristic culture of their own. The Europeans who followed them developed a lively trade with Australia (some 1,200 miles away), but this steadily dwindled in the second half of the nineteenth century.

"Pakeha"¹ New Zealanders came overwhelmingly from Britain, traded with Britain, were defended by Britain, and for generation after generation continued to refer to Britain as "home." Successive New Zealand governments were reluctant to accept formal independence even when it was offered to them. True, New Zealanders had enjoyed the essentials of independence since the mid-nineteenth century. Yet until 1947, they failed to ratify the relevant clauses of the Statute of Westminster, passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1931.

Thus in the years prior to World War II, 70 per cent to 80 per cent of the total value of all the country's exports went to Britain;

following the war, imports from Britain were as high as 60 per cent. The United Kingdom provided a sheltered favorable market, reinforcing kinship connections so that most New Zealanders believed that there was an indissoluble bond between their two countries. The relationship was not regarded as one of colonial status but as a willing, mutually profitable, dependence. On this basis, New Zealanders early succeeded in pioneering an advanced type of welfare state, a remarkable achievement in a nation whose staple exports were exclusively primary agricultural products.

The threatened breakdown of the conditions favoring continuance of this status of willing dependence during the 1960's, therefore, came as a major blow to New Zealanders, placing in jeopardy all that they had achieved in the past. The fundamental changes which occurred in the 1960's owed little to any national aspirations, but were largely a direct result of the new role of Great Britain in world affairs. The development of national awareness largely followed, rather than preceded, change. Great Britain's decision to withdraw all forces from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, together with her decision to try to enter the European Economic Community, affected New Zealand more than any other of Britain's former dominions. In one decade, both the defensive screen and the secure markets (upon which so much of New Zealand's prosperity was

¹ "Pakeha" is the term widely used by both Maoris and Europeans to describe New Zealanders of European origin as distinct from the Polynesian "Maoris."

based) disappeared. This "most loyal" of all the old so-called "Dominions" discovered that loyalty alone was no longer enough and that the apparently indissoluble bonds had been greatly weakened.

It is to the credit of New Zealanders that there has been little carping about their fate; they fully recognize Britain's position and readily concede that the British must look to their own interests first.² But the result has been that almost for the first time New Zealanders have become conscious of their own interests and attitudes apart from those of Britain. Today, a quiet New Zealand nationalism is steadily being forged.

A NATIONAL OUTLOOK

It would be wrong to attribute these changes exclusively to the changed role of Britain, for there have long been signs within New Zealand of a very gradual development of a national outlook. In the 1930's and the 1940's politicians had shown some understanding of the country's need to develop a national outlook as a small nation. In 1952, New Zealand with Australia and the United States joined the ANZUS alliance from which Great Britain was excluded. In the 1950's, moves were also initiated to widen the base of New Zealand's economy and lessen her dependence on primary products and world market prices. Nothing, however, could have prepared New Zealanders adequately for the problems that confronted them in the 1960's. Not only was a high proportion of New Zealand's exports sent to Britain, but her whole economy was based upon a very narrow range of exports produced with great efficiency and specifically tailored to the needs of the British market.

New Zealand is a temperate country and although it might hope to sell its wool clip in different parts of the world (albeit against heavy competition from synthetics) there appear to be few alternative markets for its

butter, cheese and lamb products. These are luxury items for many of the nations bordering the Pacific and are either unwanted or subject to high tariffs elsewhere. Moreover, with a population of only 2.75 million and a small domestic market, the country presents a classic example of the weakness of small nations in tariff negotiations such as the Kennedy Round.

Fortunately, the delay in Great Britain's admission to the E.E.C. has provided a useful breathing space; important changes took place in the country's economy throughout the 1960's. There were major developments in the production and export of forest products—particularly wood pulp and paper; a small steel industry was established and a major aluminum smelter based on abundant hydro-electric power resources will come into operation early in the 1970's. Exports are developing in a wide range of manufactured goods, from toys to carpets and electrical goods, while tourism is becoming an important source of overseas funds. These developments have been paralleled by a marked expansion in the range of New Zealand's overseas markets, notably in the United States and in the countries bordering the Pacific. Important trading links have been forged with Australia under the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreements of 1965 and this has provided a useful stimulus to manufacturers. Taken together with New Zealand's currency devaluation in 1967, the trade agreement has had a major effect in reducing New Zealand's 4:1 trade deficit with Australia.

Exports to Japan have increased from \$(NZ) 6.2 million in fiscal 1953 to \$63.2 million in fiscal 1967. Against this must be reckoned the fact that over 80 per cent of the total value of New Zealand's exports continues to be derived from wool, meat and dairy produce, and that some 40 per cent of all exports continue to go to one market—the United Kingdom. The economy, therefore, remains vulnerable, because New Zealand is largely dependent upon the physical export of goods, receiving little return from supplementary sources such as invest-

² As one British writer has put it: "Ironically, the greatest degree of understanding, if not entirely of sympathy, for the British problem came from the country which had most to lose, New Zealand." J. M. Livingstone, *Britain and the World Economy* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1966).

ment, insurance and shipping services. Moreover, she has not so far shared in the Australian mineral boom, although recent oil prospects off the Taranaki coast may very well indicate a change in fortune which could have a dramatic impact on this mini-economy in the future.

The economic outlook, therefore, is not without hope, but in the short term New Zealand is, and is likely to remain, dangerously vulnerable to changes taking place far from her own shores.

POLITICAL STABILITY

In view of the scale of the problems that faced the country in the 1960's, it may seem remarkable that there has been no change in the conditions of political stability which have long characterized this remote island nation. The political system is remarkably open. In terms of legal safeguards New Zealand is the only democratic country in the world which succeeds in governing itself successfully without either a second chamber or a written constitution. Even the 1956 Electoral Act—the nearest approach to a formal written constitution—is only morally, not legally, entrenched. Thus the whole political system depends upon a high degree of consensus.

Despite a steady growth in urban population, a strong egalitarian tradition and triennial elections, the National party dominated the politics of the 1960's, consistently maintaining a majority over its Labour party opponents. With its return to power for three more years in November, 1969, it has now been in office for 17 of the last 20 years and has been largely responsible for New Zealand's postwar development.

In theory, the National party is the party of the right, avowing principles of free enterprise and stressing incentives, while the Labour party represents the socialist alternative, stressing principles of social justice in the face of capitalist economics, preferring nationalization or state control of industry to unfettered private enterprise. In practice, there is no such dichotomy; neither party fits the stereotype. The Labour party, for example, fully accepts the private enterprise

basis of the economy while the National party accepts a high degree of state regulation and control of industry. Essentially, New Zealand has a mixed economy of state and private enterprise and the parties reflect the lack of any fundamental ideological cleavage. Both major parties tend in practice to be highly pragmatic in their outlook. The National party, when out of office in the 1940's, found itself obliged to adopt the principles of the welfare state established by Labour while Labour succeeded in dropping its nationalization objectives without any of the trauma suffered by its British counterpart. Today, both major parties are middle-of-the-road and their policies differ in emphasis rather than substance. The Labour party has traditionally been the party of the workers and although its leader, Norman Kirk, recently revealed his hopes that it would evolve into a more broadly based Social Democratic type of party, it still places heavier emphasis on the needs of the less-well-off in the state and retains very close ties with the Workers' Unions. Even here, however, relations between the leadership of the Labour party and the union leadership—particularly the powerful Federation of Labour—have often left much to be desired and it has been an open secret in recent years that the leader of the Federation of Labour has been on better terms with the late Minister of Labour in the national government, the Honourable Tom Shand, than with his Labour allies.

The National party, for its part, has been careful to maintain a wide appeal to all sections of the community, and if it offers less to the less-well-off than Labour considers desirable it also offers less to the middle class than its own supporters would like. There can be no doubt that the present Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, has balanced the needs of various sectors of the community most astutely, a factor which has been influential in the success of his party at the polls. Thus in the general election held in November, 1969, the National party emphasized its experienced team and policies of economic development for the 1970's based on indicative planning, even at the cost of

postponing desirable reforms in the welfare and educational systems. The Labour party, in effect, reversed these priorities, claiming that a number of reforms could be implemented immediately and that the remainder could be financed over the next three years by increased production.

The present government quarreled with few of the individual proposals put forward by the opposition (some of which were closely akin to their own proposals) maintaining instead that the overall Labour program was impracticable on the grounds of cost. Much of the comparison between the two parties centered on this question and the relative merits of the respective leaderships. One of the few major differences of substance between the two parties concerned the question of the war in Vietnam but even this was played in a low key, despite attempts by local minority groups of youths opposing the war who tried to disrupt political meetings. Both parties favored in principle the withdrawal of New Zealand's small contingent of 500 men serving in Vietnam, but the Labour party finally espoused a policy of immediate withdrawal not dissimilar to that advocated by the Australian Labour party, while the National party expressed greater concern to fulfill New Zealand's obligations to her allies and saw no immediate prospect of bringing the troops home.

There are also similar differences in New Zealand in attitudes to overseas investment. The National party generally sees foreign investment as vital to the development of the nation's resources, although it had no hesitation in arbitrarily excluding millionaire Canadian newspaper owner Lord Thompson when he sought to break the local press monopoly. The Labour party, on the other hand, is more cautious, with a more marked penchant towards economic nationalism and greater suspicion of the profit motive; it concedes that overseas investment is necessary, but tends to regard it far more grudgingly.

Despite the lack of differences between the two major parties, third parties have met with little success. A Social Credit Political League has been active in New Zealand for

many years, and since 1954 it has regularly contested practically every seat in the country. But although it succeeded in winning 14 per cent of the total valid vote in the 1966 general election, it won only one seat, which it lost again in 1969. Other minor parties have met with even less success, and independent members rarely gain any significant support. The result is a stable if somewhat inflexible system.

Members of Parliament know that without the party label they are doomed, and this reinforces the tight majority-dominated discipline to which M.P.'s subject themselves. Both parties use the caucus system, deciding policy collectively at their weekly meetings. Except in most exceptional circumstances, once policy is decided by the majority it is binding upon all members of the caucus, with the result that all the real decisions take place in secret. Members' activities in Parliament are thus often reduced to the level of ritual performances. Partly because of their small size, partly because of the ethos of the country, New Zealand parliamentary parties are among the most highly disciplined parties outside the totalitarian systems. There can be no doubt that the caucus system serves a very useful purpose, but the wisdom of the strict discipline with which it has become associated in recent years is another question. There are already signs that with the impact of television and the slow increase in the size of Parliament there may be some gradual relaxation of the over-discipline that has characterized the past. Any such relaxation has to come from within the parties, since it seems unlikely to be brought about by the effective intervention of third parties.

STATUS OF MAORIS

New Zealand's growing consciousness of her Pacific environment together with the heightened world interest in racial questions has led to greater concern in New Zealand about the place of the Maoris in society. Since the defeat of militant Maoris in the so-called Maori Wars in the middle of the nineteenth century, New Zealand has come to enjoy an almost unrivaled reputation for

racial harmony. Europeans tend to take the credit for this, partly on the grounds that they introduced what was a very advanced system of parliamentary representation for the Maoris as long ago as 1867. Under this system Maoris vote for four of their own representatives on a separate roll. To achieve this they were granted adult male suffrage some 20 years in advance of the Europeans themselves. This was intended to be a temporary system of separate representation preceding the integration of the two races onto the same roll, but largely because of Maori fears that integration of the rolls might well lead to the disappearance of any specifically Maori representation in Parliament, the system has persisted.

Today, technically those of more than half Maori blood must vote on the Maori roll; those of less than half Maori blood must vote on the European roll; half-castes have the right of choice. In practice, the system is administered very loosely. No one has ever been prosecuted for voting on the wrong roll, or is likely to be, for there is no scientific basis for the distinction. In general, those who regard themselves as Maoris—even Europeans who have married Maoris—tend to vote on the Maori rolls, while those who think of themselves as European use that roll. Moreover, Maoris can and do stand for European seats and Europeans can stand for Maori seats. One celebrated half-caste, Sir James Carroll, was returned for both Maori and European seats at different times and rose to the position of acting Prime Minister.

Despite the flexibility with which it is administered, however, the system is fundamentally inequitable, for Maori representation is pegged at four members while European representation is slowly increasing, despite the fact that the Maori population increase is some 2.5 times greater than that of the European. Although there are some very able Maori representatives in Parliament, the present system has tended to become ossified, and New Zealand's reputation for racial harmony owes far more to the tolerance of popular attitudes than to any success in finding constitutional solutions to the

problem of racial representation. Indeed, the real problems in this sphere have yet to be faced. There is still an ample fund of good will on both sides so that, if the search for a permanent solution is not left too long, New Zealand may still offer a unique opportunity for pioneering an effective political answer to the problems of different races living in harmony.

During the second half of the 1960's, foreign policy became the subject of public debate in New Zealand to an extent unparalleled in any earlier period. The burning issue was and is the war in Vietnam and, as elsewhere, it has often been discussed as a moral problem. The implications of New Zealand's participation, however, transcend in importance any single aspect of the problem. In terms of policy, Vietnam represents New Zealand's first independent essay in foreign policy, for this is the first conflict in which New Zealand has become engaged without Great Britain as an ally.

From World War II until the mid-1960's, for all practical purposes New Zealand followed two semi-distinct foreign policies simultaneously. The old Commonwealth connection continued to provide the main structure of policy but general defense backing was provided from 1951 onwards by the ANZUS treaty with Australia and the United States, an alliance from which the United Kingdom was excluded. At first, it seemed that New Zealand's commitment to two separate national policies and two distinct areas of interest in Southeast Asia might be bridged by the Manila Pact signed in 1954 to which both Britain and the United States were signatories, but this did not prove to be the case.

By the mid-1960's, faced with active commitments to both Britain and the United States, New Zealand's policies had begun to show signs of strain. With the combined strength of her army, navy and air force less than 13,000 in 1968, it was clear that New Zealand's contribution to two theaters could rarely rise above the level of token support. The country's forces in Vietnam, for example, have been limited to just over 500 men. Al-

though integration has taken place with the much larger Australian forces, grave doubts have persisted about the military value of such a contribution as distinct from the political value to a United States government increasingly anxious to mollify domestic opinion. Worse, despite her formal status as an ally of the United States, for much of the 1960's New Zealand's governments seem to have received scant consideration from their major partner when policy changes have been formulated. The apparently inferior status accorded the allies of the United States (although perhaps justified on military grounds) has led to considerable resentment in New Zealand. More recent United States policies appear to allow much greater scope for consultation even with minor allies such as New Zealand and it may well be that the monolithic policies of the Lyndon Johnson era have disappeared. Nonetheless, the legacy of public suspicion is likely to linger.

The difficulties of New Zealand's Vietnam policy have been paralleled and partly exacerbated by the projected termination of Britain's military commitments East of Suez. Prime Minister Keith Holyoake has compared the effect of the British decision on New Zealand's policies to the crisis caused by the fall of Singapore in 1942. The question of whether New Zealand, with Australia, could or should retain a presence in Malaysia after the departure of the British has proved an exceptionally difficult one, particularly in relation to such problems as the defense of East Malaysia. Important differences have arisen between Australia and New Zealand over the extent to which the commitment should be spelled out and even where the troops should be based.

Nevertheless, both Australia and New Zealand have decided to continue to play a role in the area without Britain. The role is not clearly defined and there is no formal agreement. This, then, is an extremely flexible policy, based on the belief that the damage of an immediate withdrawal would probably be more serious than the problems which may arise if Australia and New Zealand continue to play a role. In this policy, New

Zealand has been taking a full part in collaboration with Australia (perhaps more effectively at the infrastructural level than at the political level).

So far, the decisions which have been made reflect a high degree of caution and a strong adherence to the continuance of past commitments. This may be partly explained by the fact that underlying the commitment to specific allies there are two deeply ingrained principles in New Zealand's foreign policy—collective defense and trade. The prewar tradition which saw collective defense largely in terms of collective Commonwealth defense has been transmuted into more truly international arrangements. At the same time, New Zealand's main area of activity has been the Pacific basin; her former commitment to the defense of Empire communications such as the Suez Canal has been dropped. Thus, since World War II, New Zealand troops have taken part in actions in Korea, in the Malayan Emergency, in Thailand, in the Indonesian confrontation and in Vietnam. In the process, New Zealand's interest in the borders of the Pacific has steadily evolved. Relationships which were indirect when they started have become direct. This process is mirrored in the establishment of New Zealand diplomatic posts in the area, posts which have usually followed rather than preceded involvement.

This tendency to collectivity in defense is paralleled by developments in the economic sphere where, since World War II, New Zealand has been seeking solutions to her economic problems partly through collective action. Today, with her membership in such organizations as ECAFE, the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank and ASPAC, New Zealand's policy has again led her to
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"In a general sense, Australia has traditionally been one of the perimeters for Japanese economic or political expansion southwards; at the same time, Australia has formed a major and permanent axis of American trans-Pacific influence."

Australia as an Indo-Pacific Power

BY HARRY G. GELBER

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AT THE BEGINNING of the 1970's, Australia is in the midst of important reappraisals of her position in the world. These have been caused by a variety of external circumstances: new doubts about the role of the United States in Asia; the economic and political rise of Japan; the decline of Britain and the Commonwealth as effective factors in areas of primary Australian concern; a declining belief in the reality of a threat either from the Soviet Union or from "Asian communism."

At home, too, there have been changes. Old judgments have come to be sharply questioned. Australians are having to accustom themselves to living not merely with a permanent sense of weakness but with a permanent and real measure of insecurity. There is a greater sense of Australia's involvement not only with Asia but with Asian poverty and social problems. At the same time, economic developments have begun a radical transformation of the whole Australian economy and, with it, Australian potentials in a variety of fields.

Foreign affairs, in Australia as elsewhere, are very much a minority preoccupation. Public debate, again as elsewhere, tends to be marked by much exaggeration and confusion. The government is charged with an overly simplistic belief in an Asian Communist threat. Yet few would seriously suggest that the presence or absence of Communist governments is irrelevant to the practical be-

havior of Asian states. And it is clear that anticommunism is an authentic Australian response. Or it is argued that Australia has blindly relied on the United States at a time when President Richard Nixon, and United States policies in Vietnam, have shown that the United States cannot always be relied upon.

However, Australian ministers have said for years that the country has interests of its own in Vietnam and no serious proposal for a denunciation of the ANZUS security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States has surfaced anywhere in Washington.

One of the more interesting aspects of the debate, moreover, is the way in which it revolves around points of emphasis rather than principle. There is argument about how far Australia should accommodate herself to the Soviet Union's new interest in South and Southeast Asia. But few suggest that Australia's response should be indifference. It has been said that Australia cannot rely on the United States; but few argue that Australia should not rely on the United States if she can. Indeed, not merely the Liberal/Country party government but also the Australian Labour party opposition are importantly committed to the American alliance. During much of the 1960's the Liberals repeatedly scored electoral successes on the issue of Labour's allegedly doubtful loyalty to the United States tie. Though differences

between the parties remain, they do not seem to be of fundamental importance.

Yet in a sense, appearances are deceptive. Beneath the public debates the real positions of the opposing party leaders are closer than they have been for years. This is so, paradoxically, because there has indeed been some structural change in the Australian foreign policy debate. Prime Minister John Gorton and Gough Whitlam are closer together than Prime Minister Robert Menzies and Arthur Calwell were, in part precisely because their choices have become both narrower and more difficult to reverse. Debates about whether Australia should station soldiers in Malaysia or whether she should adopt one or another version of the "Fortress Australia" policy, or whether she should operate inside or outside the United States alliance: these are debates about how Australia should behave without major allies at her elbow.

This is a novel situation in Australian history. For the first time, Australia is faced with the possibility of becoming a party principal to a major international dispute, instead of remaining the smaller partner safely relying on a greater power, as she was in both world wars, in Korea, in Vietnam and in the Malaysian emergency. In this rather special sense, Australia's position has indeed changed.

ECONOMIC CHANGES

Economic developments in Australia in recent years have been remarkable. National development, the opening up of the continent which is the heritage of Australians, has usually been a central aim of public policy. Its fulfillment has required immigration programs and the import of capital, equipment and know-how required to develop the land and its resources. Immigration has required the maintenance of a standard of living high enough to attract migrants, together with the avoidance of unemployment. These needs have been met by a Gross National Product (G.N.P.) which has grown by 5.2 per cent in real terms in the five years to mid-1969,¹

with growth at 8.7 per cent in 1968-1969 and a further 6 per cent growth expected in 1969-1970.

Traditionally, trade has played an important role in such growth. Exports and imports together have in recent years been equivalent to 26 per cent of the Australian G.N.P. compared to some 7 per cent for the United States. Furthermore, the standard of living, national development and industrial growth have all depended upon an ability to import goods including capital goods and fuel. Traditionally, also, such imports have been financed by exports of agricultural products: in 1968-1969 Australia's largest export earners remained wool, wheat and meat and sugar, in that order.

But during the second half of the 1960's came a development which seems destined to revolutionize the entire economic structure of the country. Mineral discovery and exploitation are likely to make Australia into one of the world's two largest exporters of minerals within a few years. Export earnings from this source have risen from \$385 million² in 1965 to a probable \$1,100 million in 1970 and will, according to the government, reach about \$2,200 million by mid-1970. Australia is known to have 3,000 million tons of bauxite, estimated by the United States Geological Survey in 1967 to represent 35 per cent of the world's reserves. Large deposits of manganese and nickel have been found. As for oil, in the mid-1960's Australia imported almost all her oil. By 1971, some 60 to 70 per cent of her crude oil needs will be met from domestic sources. In 1968-1969, Australia imported some \$275 million worth of oil per annum. By 1973-1974, \$200 million will be saved through domestic production.

Australia is likely to maintain her position as the world's largest exporter of lead and an important exporter of zinc and, regionally, of coal. Above all, there is iron ore. The head of one of the largest iron ore mining combines has estimated that in the Pilbara region of Western Australia alone the total ore tonnage may be as high as 100 trillion tons, or 400 times as much as the known North American reserves, much of it at equiv-

¹ *The Australian Economy 1969* (Canberra: the Treasury, July, 1969), p. 7.

² All money figures are expressed here in \$ U.S.

alent or better grades of ore content. At 1969 rates of consumption, these reserves would be enough to keep world production going for 140,000 years.

Such figures are likely to have global significance. It has been estimated that world population growth, together with increases in per capita consumption, might produce a five-fold increase in world demand for minerals by the year 2000. During early 1969, a senior Interior Department official testified before a United States Senate committee that unless there was an improvement in American minerals technology, the United States would by 1975 have deficits of more than 20 per cent in domestic minerals production.³

From an Australian point of view, these developments are changing not only the domestic economy but also the nation's international position. Australian trade continues to veer away from markets in Britain and Europe toward newer markets in the Pacific, notably toward the United States and Japan. Australian-Japanese trade has grown, partly as a result of Japan's rapid domestic economic growth, partly because of Australia's geographic convenience for Japan and partly because of a high degree of complementarity between the Japanese and Australian economies. Japanese demands for Australian goods have been concentrated on those food-stuffs and industrial raw materials in which Australians specialized. Australian import demand, on the other hand, was and is for manufactured goods of a kind which Japan and the United States are well placed to send.

Australian mineral exports to Japan, in particular, have a potential strategic as well as a present economic importance. Japan already buys some 60 per cent of Australia's total mineral exports, including 85 per cent of Australia's iron ore and nearly all her coal

exports. Japan, for her part, is expected to get 50 per cent of the iron ore she needs from Australia by the early 1970's and over 40 per cent of her coal needs. Given the overall boom in Japan's energy consumption it remains unclear whether her current search for alternative sources of energy can significantly reduce, in the near future, this dependence upon a single source of supply.

This development of Australian resources has obviously required adequate investment not only of capital but of skills and technology. Foreign investors supply some 8 per cent to 10 per cent of Australia's annual capital investment. Total foreign investment in the decade to mid-1969 has been about \$6.5 billion.⁴ Probably something under half of this has come from the United States. But United States investment has been heavily concentrated at key growth points in the Australian economy and the investment has brought highly important imports of technical and managerial skills and commercial connections. This applies not only to mineral exploration and exploitation, but to the motor industry, pharmaceuticals and oil refining. At the same time, this capital inflow not only has implications for development and industrial growth, but has in the past been essential in order to balance the deficits in visible trade which Australia regularly incurs.

These developmental, trading and financial patterns may have important implications for the wider trans-Pacific relations of the 1970's. If Japan increasingly relies upon Australian minerals, the discovery and exploitation of those minerals depend to a considerable extent not only upon United States capital but upon the Australian sense of security derived from United States guarantees. Australian minerals may come to play a significant role in maintaining Japanese growth and the political stability which depends, in part, upon it. Australian minerals may also play an increasing role in supplying North America. At the same time, Australia's economic growth depends to a significant extent upon continued growth (and therefore imports) in Japan. Japan in turn depends greatly on markets in and trad-

³ It remains to be seen, of course, how the United States will assess the strategic as well as the economic costs of an improvement in United States minerals technology and reliance upon more expensive exploitation of lower-grade ores under exclusive United States control, as against cheaper, higher grade but foreign supplies. The political and alliance attitudes of the would-be supplier will presumably not be irrelevant here.

⁴ *The Australian Economy 1969*, p. 9.

ing finance from North America, as well as on access to American technology. This triangular economic relationship seems likely to play an important role in political and strategic decision-making in all three nations during the next decade.

AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Australian defense expenditure, after rising rapidly during the middle 1960's, reached nearly \$1.3 billion in 1968, or 4.8 per cent of G.N.P. In 1969, the figure dropped slightly to \$1.2 billion. The Australians, who operate a two-year selective service system, have armed forces totaling nearly 90,000 men out of a population of nearly 12.5 million. The army has nine infantry battalions. Three of these, together with supporting services, are serving in Vietnam, and one is stationed in Malaysia. It follows that nearly half the total Australian infantry force is overseas at any given time. In addition to these infantry battalions, there are a number of specialist units and artillery regiments. The Army has a complement of helicopters, and additional medium CH-47 helicopters are on order from the United States.

The Royal Australian Navy operates one light carrier, three guided missile destroyers and three modern submarines (with a fourth on order from Britain), as well as a variety of other smaller craft. The air force includes a squadron of Canberra bombers, at least three squadrons of Mirage III fighters, two squadrons of maritime reconnaissance planes and a small medium transport capability. Some F-111's are on order from the United States. The placing of the order, and the Australian government's decision not to cancel it following mishaps to the plane at the development stage, have been politically highly controversial. If and when the planes are delivered, they will give Australia a delivery system at least potentially available for nuclear weapons also.

The implications of such forces are fairly clear. Nine infantry battalions, themselves highly mobile and supported by units resembling the national guard, could protect the continent in the unlikely event of a small

conventional threat. The force offers some prospect of success even against a medium threat and, most important of all, is in any case sufficient to compel the attacker to operate on a scale almost certain to trigger United States intervention. In each category, the Australian forces are sufficient, and sufficiently trained and equipped, to make a useful contribution in regional conflict situations, but not large enough to be able to operate overseas in independent fashion, let alone in a way which could carry an offensive threat to anyone else. Even the Australian navy clearly lacks the capability to control the approaches to Australia by itself. Yet it could make operations in the seas close to Australia difficult or dangerous for hostile navies; or it could support allied navies farther afield. At the nuclear level, Australia must similarly rely on United States guarantees, although some Australians are arguing that the nation should acquire a nuclear weapons capability, or the option of one against a potential threat from China.

SOME STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

Stated in these terms, military capabilities themselves strongly suggest, indeed compel, the maintenance of strong links with a powerful ally whose aims are as far as possible compatible with the social and political aims of Australian governments. This means—as it has meant for three decades—the United States.

However, Australian interests are also involved in South and East Asia. Policies in these areas have not been and cannot be confined to programs which are shared by the United States, or programs of which the United States approves. In spite of the troubled public debate, therefore, Australian defense and foreign policies have retained their essential dualism in balancing the interests of the United States relationship against a variety of other considerations in Asia.

The emphasis has shifted, sometimes in important ways. But no ultimate choice between the two has been, or can be, made. The whole course of Australian foreign

policy since at least the mid-1950's confirms that economic and strategic links with the United States and the Australian search for friends in Southeast Asia (culminating in the decision to maintain a small Australian force in Malaysia after the British leave in 1971)⁵ are complementary and not alternative policies.

Much Australian policy should be seen in terms of this dualism and the consequent distinction between those interests and purposes which Australia can support by herself and those for which her own power is inadequate. Speaking of Australia's roles in Asia, Professor Wang Gungwu of Canberra has suggested a helpful distinction between her neighborly roles with respect to Indonesia and the new states of the South Pacific; her regional role in Southeast Asia; and her continental role with respect to the Asian mainland and Japan.⁶ One might, perhaps, add a fourth category: her role in the strategy of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Clearly each of these roles involves different sorts of Australian relationships and capabilities and different requirements for alliance support.

The Australian relationship with Indonesia is primary in the sense that Indonesia is Australia's closest neighbor, the only nation with whom Australia shares a border (in Papua/New Guinea) and a country of large population and great potential wealth. Australian diplomacy has traditionally been sensitive about Indonesia, beginning with Australian support for Indonesian indepen-

dence during the late 1940's. Even during the period of Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation in the early 1960's, when Australia supported Indonesia's enemies, she maintained reasonable diplomatic relations with Jakarta. Following the 1965 coup and the Communist defeat, Australians have once again been careful to stress their relationship with Indonesia and their support for Indonesian development. Some problems remain. Australians are wary about that New Guinea border. Some Australians also worry about the day when Indonesia's raw material wealth produces real economic strength and potentially offensive military power.

The principal aspects of Australia's regional role have perhaps been her involvement with Malaysia and Singapore, and her part in regional economic and developmental activities. In general, Australia has encouraged arrangements which would produce a relatively stable balance within the region and would further economic development. (It has usually been assumed that economic development would also encourage stability. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be true.) Australia is involved in Singapore and Malaysia for a variety of reasons including habit and sentiment, dating back to the connection established by their common membership in the British Commonwealth. But there is also the notion that if Australia does not maintain these links, strengthened by tradition and political custom, the whole idea of a genuine Australian interest in Asia will begin to lack credibility.⁷ Malaysia and Singapore are, in this sense, Australia's political bridges to Asia.

There is also Australia's desire to give general help to friendly states and not to encourage Indonesian preponderance in the region; and there is the importance of Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. The continuation of an Australian presence would be useful also to the United States and Japan and would therefore be a specifically Australian contribution to regional stability and to the aims in the area which Australia shares with her allies.⁸

Australia's continental role presumably affects, in the first place, her involvement in

⁵ For Gorton's announcement in Parliament on February 2, 1969, see *Current Notes on International Affairs* (Canberra), February, 1969, pp. 41-46.

⁶ "The Compulsion to Look South: Asian Awareness of Australia," *Meanjin Quarterly* (Melbourne), Vol. 28, 1969, No. 116, pp. 49-58.

⁷ As Bruce Grant wrote in 1968: "If we stay [in Southeast Asia] we show that we regard Australia as part of the region." *Australian Defence: A Regional Role, Australia's Neighbours*, Fourth Series, Nos. 52-53, January-February, 1968.

⁸ Whether this argument is entirely valid is another matter. The presence of Australian troops is so hedged with conditions as to make it quite doubtful whether in any of the more likely conflict situations—especially communal troubles in Malaysia or trouble between Malaysia and Indonesia—the Australian government would actually allow its troops to be used.

Vietnam, and her attitude towards China. In neither respect, clearly, could Australia hope to sustain any forward policy for herself. In Vietnam in particular, therefore, the customary Australian policy of "forward defense" has come under criticism. For much of the middle and late 1960's, major government arguments in favor of Australian involvement in Vietnam were based on Australia's need to stand by the Americans if Australians wished the United States to stand by them, and her obligation to help the United States sustain a presence in Southeast Asia. Otherwise, the United States might withdraw from the region altogether.

With the start of United States troop withdrawals in Vietnam, these arguments have rebounded against the government. The United States, critics have said, will withdraw in any case. "Forward defense" was always an illusion. Australia cannot rely on the United States. Much of this criticism goes too far. Australia sent troops into Vietnam for a variety of reasons in addition to the wish to support the United States, including her fear of the effects of a North Vietnamese victory on the internal situations in Malaysia and Indonesia and on the security of Singapore and the Straits. Moreover, while a United States withdrawal from Vietnam would (or will) obviously make an Australian presence there impossible, and while this will make one aspect of forward defense untenable, it will not of itself make the concept undesirable. It need not prevent other forward defense operations.⁹

Vis-à-vis China, too, a great political wariness on the part of successive Australian governments has not prevented the emergence of a lively trading relationship with Peking. It has been assumed, perhaps sensibly, that China's weight and numbers are likely to make her a major factor in the future of Southern Asia. But it has also been assumed that Chinese declarations of hostility to the United States and the West mean what they say and that Australians should oppose a major Chinese influence in the region until

such time as that hostility finally abates.

Finally, there is Australia's role in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. In a general sense, Australia has traditionally been one of the perimeters for Japanese economic or political expansion southwards; at the same time Australia has formed a major and permanent axis of American trans-Pacific influence. On those occasions—as in December, 1941—when the Pacific interests of the United States in the Northern Hemisphere were under attack, it was at once recognized that the American connection with Australia offered a means of containing the threat. In the future, too, one would expect that if United States trans-Pacific interests became endangered, or its position for any reason became untenable or too burdensome, Australia would become more valuable as a friend and ally. An American withdrawal from Vietnam, for example, would in most foreseeable circumstances have such an effect.

More specifically, Australia has made her territory available for United States military bases and communication stations, including early warning systems. This has profound implications for Australia's whole international position. She is similarly available as a base for space exploration—indeed at present she offers the biggest United States space exploration base outside the United States itself. Parallel with this is Australia's control of important entry ports into the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal is closed. Passage around South Africa implies some dependence upon that country, with at least

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⁹ The Australian role in Singapore and Malaysia is obviously a case in point.

In reviewing North Vietnam's actions in recent years, this writer points out that "Despite their public confidence in their ability to lead their followers to victory in the South, the D.R.V. leaders continue to show every sign that they are far from united on the precise mixture of military, political and diplomatic ingredients that should go into the struggle."

The Future of North Vietnam

BY ARTHUR J. DOMMEN
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HO CHI MINH, the founder of the second Asian Communist state (after the Mongolian People's Republic), died in 1969 without seeing his cherished dream of reunifying his divided homeland fulfilled. He left in the hands of his successors the responsibility for pursuing the war in South Vietnam to a satisfactory conclusion and they, in turn, pledged to persevere in the flexible and inventive tactics that served "Uncle Ho" so well in his extraordinary career as a revolutionary.

Hanoi's contention to be the sole legal government in Vietnam is set forth in the first sentence of the preamble to the January 1, 1960, Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which describes the territory of the D.R.V. as extending from Langson to Camau. From Hanoi's point of view, the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (created on December 20, 1960, with its program of forming a coalition government) embodied a claim to interim sovereignty in the South to fill the gap left by the 1954 partition and the failure to hold the reunification elections in July, 1956, provided for at Geneva. A continuing basic objective of the D.R.V. government has been to destroy the claim to sovereignty of the government in Saigon.

The South has preoccupied leaders of the D.R.V. ever since 1960, when, at the Third Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers) party, it was stated that the North was well launched

on the road to socialism while in the South the advent of the bourgeois-led national democratic revolution could not be far off. At that time, D.R.V. leaders could not see what a long road lay ahead, or that they would be required to make unprecedented sacrifices.

After its initial period of growth from 1959 to 1962, the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) was placed under great pressure by the introduction into the war of American helicopters and by South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's program of building strategic hamlets throughout the countryside. North Vietnam never made any secret of its support for the N.L.F., and in the spring of 1961 she dispatched to the South the first groups of graduates of the Xuan Mai training school specially trained for southern conditions to help the N.L.F. insurgents.

It has since been disclosed from several sources that in 1962 the D.R.V., with the backing of the Soviet Union, was interested in bringing the problem of the war in the South to the conference table. The basis for such negotiations would have been the restoration of the *status quo* provided for by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, that is to say, a cessation of hostilities, and discussions between the governments in Saigon and Hanoi with a view to the eventual reunification of Vietnam. The N.L.F., for its part, was reportedly willing to take part in such a scheme in return for its inclusion in a government

of national union following the Laos model.¹

The attitude of the United States delegation at the Geneva Conference on Laos led by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was not promising, however. The North Vietnamese received no hint that a proposal for negotiations about South Vietnam would elicit American encouragement, and the opportunity presented by the participation of delegations from the two rival Vietnamese governments at the same conference table was let slip by. Colonel Ha Van Lau of North Vietnam's delegation made the point when he confided to a French diplomat towards the close of the 14-month-long proceedings, "*Maintenant, c'est la guerre.*" Barely was the ink dry on the Laos accord when, in August, 1962, Hanoi began moving 100-vehicle convoys over newly improved roads through Laos to supply the insurgent forces fighting in the South.

Hanoi was apparently still disposed to deal with the Saigon government in the hope of avoiding a further widening of the war as late as August, 1963. At the beginning of that year Ho Chi Minh told the Indian chairman of the International Control Commission that "President Diem is a patriot after his fashion" and in August he told Wilfred Burchett in an interview that

in order to have the foreign interventionists withdraw it seems that a ceasefire could be negotiated between the Diemist forces and those of the Liberation Front.²

In March, 1965, Hanoi lost another opportunity to bring the situation in South Vietnam to a conference table when the

¹Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the N.L.F. Central Committee, told the French writer Georges Chaffard in August, 1962, that "the success of the Geneva Conference peacefully settling the Laos problem on the basis of respect for that country's independence, neutrality and territorial integrity furnishes fresh proof of the possibility of resolving by negotiations all conflicts arising in the interior of a country, on condition that all foreign intervention ceases." Chaffard, *Les Deux Guerres du Vietnam* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1969), pp. 265-266. Chaffard possessed what was probably the most intimate knowledge of the N.L.F.'s diplomatic position of any European writer until his death in a tragic automobile accident near Paris in December, 1969.

²*Agence France-Presse* dispatch from Hanoi, Aug. 13, 1963, quoted in Chaffard, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

Americans began the systematic bombing of North Vietnam on March 2 and North Vietnamese and Chinese diplomats dissuaded Prince Norodom Sihanouk from calling for an international conference on Vietnam, as he had planned to do, in his address to the Indochinese People's Conference that met in Phnom Penh from March 1 to 9. Thereafter, the massive dispatch of American troops to South Vietnam changed the situation radically from Hanoi's point of view. The "puppet" character of the Saigon government was accentuated, the Americans and the N.L.F. became the principal belligerents, and to settle the war by negotiation the Americans would have to negotiate directly with the N.L.F.

The D.R.V. leaders geared their people for a long war and told their cadres in the South to exploit the massive United States presence along three principal lines. First, this presence would afford them a chance to inflict casualties on American troops, and since Americans did not like battle casualties this would increase public pressure in the United States to end the war. Second, this presence would make the Americans more dependent than ever on Vietnamese interpreters and helpers of all kinds, thereby increasing the probabilities of costly mistakes and the opportunities for infiltration and deception. Third, this presence would enable the D.R.V. to portray the war as a struggle waged by a great power against a small, inoffensive people.

A new dimension was added to the struggle for "national salvation" with the opening, on May 10, 1968, of "official conversations" between the D.R.V. and the United States. The D.R.V. used the Paris talks to diminish the legality and legitimacy of the Saigon government in the eyes of the world, especially in the eyes of the American people, to create conflicts of interest between Washington and Saigon, and to generate additional domestic pressures on the United States government by conveying the impression to influential sections of American opinion that the United States delegation was not negotiating seriously.

The talks led to the announcement on

October 31 by President Lyndon Johnson of the total halt of the bombing of North Vietnam, an event that was rightly portrayed by the D.R.V. leaders as a tactical victory. In reciprocity, Hanoi agreed to the seating at the conference table of a delegation from Saigon. Yet Hanoi's tactical aim was unchanged: United States recognition of the N.L.F.

A further development occurred in the South during the summer of 1969. On May 23, 1969, a "consultative conference" of the N.L.F. and its supporters opened at an undisclosed location and resulted in the convening, from June 6 to 8, of a "Congress of People's Representatives," which announced the formation of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam." The composition of this clandestine government was dominated by the N.L.F., but included non-N.L.F. persons as well. Hanoi approved and recognized this development and announced that "special" relations existed between the governments of the D.R.V. and the "Republic of South Vietnam," whose constitution was left unspecified. Moscow, Peking and about 20 other foreign capitals recognized the P.R.G. For the first time since 1954, Hanoi had accepted the existence of a separate state in the South, with at least some of the attributes of internal and external sovereignty.

The formation of the P.R.G. was interesting from two other points of view. It paralleled exactly the sequence of events in the Communist seizure of power in 1945, demonstrating once again the reliance of the Vietnamese Communist leaders on precedent; they dealt with the Americans as they had learned to deal with the French.

In a sense, the P.R.G. was a farewell gift to President Ho Chi Minh and it was not surprising that a delegation from the P.R.G. was among those attending his funeral on September 9, 1969, in Hanoi. A sort of seizure of power "in advance," the establishment of the P.R.G. was undoubtedly intended to demonstrate that Ho's life-long wish was being fulfilled.

Second, the formation of the P.R.G. had a

dual effect on the Paris talks. It indicated that Hanoi would recognize a separate South Vietnam. By forming a government of its own, and obtaining international recognition, however, the N.L.F. had made compromise with the Saigon government more difficult: the situation had recreated the impasse of 1861 when the Confederate States formed their own government at Montgomery, Alabama. In another sense, therefore, the formation of the P.R.G. made negotiations more difficult and increased the possibility the war could continue until one of the two antagonists had been decisively beaten.

Under Ho's dexterous guidance, the D.R.V. managed for several years to remain uncommitted in the continuing conflict between Moscow and Peking, maintaining close relations with both and deriving the benefit of aid from both. This aid has been most necessary for the D.R.V. in pursuing its objective in the South. The D.R.V. was able to reequip the N.L.F. forces in the South entirely with Communist bloc arms beginning in 1965. Now that North Vietnamese soldiers are bearing the brunt of the fighting in the South, Soviet and Chinese economic aid has become essential to help fill the gap created by the drain on manpower.

The D.R.V.'s industrial output had already been adversely affected by more than three years of continuous bombing raids, but in 1969 agriculture, the pinion of the economy, began showing signs of crisis. It was a very bad year, with a summer drought followed by floods in the autumn, and the D.R.V. had to import one million tons of Soviet wheat as well as rice from China. The wheat has been used to make noodles, and on December 6, 1969, Hanoi newspapers reported that Le Duan, the party's first secretary, had presided at the opening of a noodle factory. Despite all their difficulties, with rationing of almost all basic necessities and long lines at food shops, the North Vietnamese have not lost their sense of humor: the latest joke about socialist progress in agriculture is that great progress has been registered in at least one field—the North Vietnamese are rapidly learning how to eat Soviet wheat.

The visible economic disparity between North and South Vietnam has probably never been so great as it was in 1969, with shops in towns all over the South stocked up with consumer goods of all kinds and farmers reaping a bumper rice harvest, partly because of good weather and partly because of the introduction of new high-yielding rice varieties that promise to eliminate the South's imports of American rice. Indeed, even if Hanoi were in a position politically to drop its effort in the South, which it cannot, having already sacrificed more than a half million men on General Vo Nguyen Giap's own admission, the economic need to gain access to the rich South has become many times greater in 1970 than it was in 1960.

The United States failure in South Vietnam, Premier Pham Van Dong said recently, consists of the fact that the Americans have not created anything that is politically viable. When one looks at the quarreling politicians and innumerable factions, cliques and sects with which the South abounds, one is tempted to agree with him. Can the Communists cope better with this amorphous, unconquerable and supremely vivacious South Vietnamese body politic?

Despite their public confidence in their ability to lead their followers to victory in the South, the D.R.V. leaders continue to show every sign that they are far from united on the precise mixture of military, political and diplomatic ingredients that should go into the struggle. The public course chosen upon the death of Ho was one of deliberate caution, marked by the naming of the aged Ton Duc Thang as President. Beneath this facade, however, the underlying conflict of views between Le Duan, the party's pragmatist, and Truong Chinh, the theorist, is bound to intensify because it involves practically all party efforts, including the effort in the South.

It was probably because of just such danger of criticism within the Politburo that Giap, who belongs to the pragmatist school, published in mid-December, 1969, in Hanoi's two most important daily newspapers a

lengthy series of articles that amounted to a major revision of his theory of "people's war."³ Entitled "The Party's Military Line is the Ever-Victorious Banner of People's War in Our Country," the exposition of Giap's new strategy emphasized the ability of smaller forces to defeat larger forces in certain circumstances. Giap cited the example of Nguyen Hue, the famed general who made a forced march of 10 days from Qui Nhon (in what is now South Vietnam) all the way to Hanoi with a relatively small army and caught the larger Chinese army that had invaded northern Vietnam on the pretext of restoring law and order totally by surprise at the lunar new year of 1789. Giap wrote: "Our military art is the art of fighting the enemy in an active, resolute, lively, resourceful, creative, secret and unexpected manner."

Obviously intended to be coordinated with political and diplomatic moves, and thereby setting a higher premium on political preparations than had been evident at the time of Giap's celebrated 1968 *Tet* offensive, Giap's new strategy is apparently more suited to the overall numerical inferiority held by Communist forces in the South and the difficulty the Communists have in massing forces for frontal attacks because of improved allied intelligence and firepower. A turnaround from Giap's previous theory of the highest stage of "people's war" (in which locally superior forces could be massed against a weak point in the enemy's line of defense to achieve a breakthrough on a pre-planned timetable) the new theory appears to be intended to take advantage of opportunities as they arise.

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³ *Nhan Dan* and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, Hanoi, December 14-17, 1969.

"The hard fact is that without outside economic assistance the Trust Territory has little prospect of achieving and maintaining nationhood in today's world."

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

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THERE IS STRANGE irony in the fact that the United States, with a tradition of two centuries of anti-imperialist rhetoric, is one of the last nations formally controlling the destinies of distant, alien subjects. It is an irony recognized in Washington as well as abroad, and a search for ways to reconcile national strategic interests with the rights of the Trust Territory peoples is now in a crucial phase. Under pressure from the United Nations and from Micronesian representatives, major policy decisions must be reached in the year ahead. A target date of 1972 for an island plebiscite on future political status was set in Lyndon Johnson's administration, and American prestige is much involved in what happens.

Just how American interests came to be involved in these distant, scattered islands deserves some explanation. Americans first became concerned with the area in the middle of the nineteenth century, when American whalers and trading vessels began to visit the western Pacific in numbers. Some of their contacts with the inhabitants were hostile. None of them were more than ephemeral in terms of national interest. After mid-century, public policy became involved to the extent of a naval expedition or two among the islands to protect Americans and their property from native hostility and in some cases to protect the islanders from the rapacity of United States citizens engaged in labor-raiding or other acts of exploitation. The commander of one Navy expedition, however, discouraged national concern with the

remark that all of the Phoenix, Gilbert and Marshall groups put together did not contain enough land for a good New England farm.

A more enduring American interest was developed after 1850 by missionaries sent out from New England and from Hawaii. Their activities began in the Gilbert Islands, now British-ruled, and extended westward into the Carolines. By the early twentieth century their influence was such that Georg Irmer, one of the German administrators of that time, suggested that if the inhabitants of Micronesia were given their choice of a great power to rule them, it would be the United States. This he attributed to the influence of the missionaries.

Yet in 1898-1899, when the international status of the islands was up for grabs with Spain's removal from the Pacific, neither commercial nor missionary interests were sufficient to induce United States policy-makers to insist upon acquisition. Despite some vague talk of strategic concerns, the islands were permitted to pass into the hands of a potentially hostile Germany by purchase from Spain. This placed a screen of German-held islands across the supposedly vital line between Hawaii and the newest United States acquisitions, Guam and the Philippines.

From 1899 to 1914 the Germans controlled Micronesia, except for Guam, interfering with native ways only when the natives interfered with copra production and other commercial interests. With the outbreak of World War I, the Japanese moved swiftly to seize control of the German holdings north

of the Equator. At the war's end, they moved with equal efficiency to secure continued rule over these islands, winning European acquiescence at Versailles. Though there were some Americans who advocated a voice for the United States in determining the fate of Micronesia in 1918-1919, advancing both strategic and missionary motives, Japan's position was not effectively challenged. Even President Woodrow Wilson's rather weak reservation of American cable rights on Yap was given little more than lip-service at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Japan received a Class C mandate over the islands of what is now the Trust Territory of the Pacific, and over the succeeding years she developed a highly exclusive regime there which proved a fruitful source of rumors of sinister military plans and activities.

The strategic absurdity of attempting to defend Guam and the Philippines in the midst of or on the other side of a mass of potentially hostile naval bases became apparent as Japanese-American relations worsened in the 1930's. World War II brought home the folly at the cost of thousands of American lives and incalculable other costs. At the war's end, the United States determined to make sure that these islands would never again be used as hostile bases for attacks upon American interests.

A Congressional subcommittee which considered the future status of the Pacific Islands in the spring of 1945 assumed United States retention of the islands captured from the Japanese and spoke, in fact, as though the United States was likely to maintain most of the panoply of airfields and other bases developed there during the war. With fine disdain for the sentiments of Australian, British and French allies, some Congressmen were prepared to ask those nations to turn over to the United States their positions in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia as well.

The direct motivation for United States assumption of control over the former Japanese-mandated islands at the end of World War II, then, was military security. It was not private economic interest in exploiting the natural resources or labor force of the is-

lands. Nor was it a humanitarian concern for the physical well-being or spiritual salvation of the Micronesians. This point was made clear by the designation of the Trust Territory of the Pacific as a *strategic* trust in the agreement drawn up with the United Nations in 1947. It was the only trust territory to receive this denomination, and its meaning was made clear by provisions giving the United States the right to make military use of the islands and to screen visitors to them. As trustees we were answerable, not to the Trusteeship Council, as was the case with other such dependencies, but to the Security Council, where the veto rule existed. This was a stiff bargain driven hard, despite pressure from the Soviet Union and other U.N. members.

As the war years receded, concepts of military necessity shifted away from the islands of the western Pacific. Buildings and equipment left on wartime bases rusted; grass grew on once-busy airstrips and roads; and hastily built docks crumbled away. But United States rule continued, and with it the responsibility for administration of the islands and their inhabitants. The peoples of the Trust Territory gradually became the major concern of those charged with administration, first under Navy rule and then, after 1951, under civilian control through the Department of the Interior.

THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS

Who were the inhabitants of these islands, and what were our responsibilities toward them? During the war, the Navy had supervised some remarkable research under pressure on the Pacific islands. In a series of handbooks designed to guide Army or Navy administrators once the islands were captured from the Japanese, a large though admittedly incomplete body of information was compiled. These instructions did not attempt to lay down long-range policy for the political or economic development of Micronesia; that was not their function, nor their right. Military rule was aimed at pacification and control with a minimum of cost and friction.

For the time being that sufficed. The findings of the Navy's researchers provided the basis on which this regime began.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific islands includes an area on the earth's surface about as large as that of the continental United States, without Alaska. Its more than 2,000 islands and islets comprise a total dry land area of only about 700 square miles, reaching an extreme east-west distance of about 2,700 miles. From latitude 1° to 20° north and from longitude 130° to 172° east, the barely 100 regularly inhabited islands supported an estimated 50,000-60,000 native inhabitants at the end of World War II. This number was more than doubled by Japanese-imported laborers and administrators from the home islands, from Okinawa and from Korea. The alien population was removed in the first postwar years for repatriation to Japan. The remainder conformed sufficiently closely to the definition of what ethnologists call Micronesians to have made the terms Micronesia and Trust Territory practically interchangeable in common use.

The use of a common term and imposition of a common administrative policy, however, should not conceal the existence of wide diversity among the island inhabitants. To the outsider, there may appear a certain uniformity in stature, skin color and features among them, which leads to the application of the general classification of Malayo-Polynesian. Yet the Chamorros of the Marianas and Polynesians of Kapingamarangi and Nukunoro to the south represent both linguistic and cultural differences of importance. Even among the Micronesians (and the British-ruled Gilbertese are among these) a 1959 report to the United Nations could say:

There are basic ethnological, linguistic, religious, and social structure similarities among peoples of various island groups, but there is no Micronesian type of culture which encompasses all island peoples of the area. . . .

There are nine major languages in the area, with differences which make interpreters necessary, and many dialect variations within each.

All the peoples of the Trust Territory share

the cultural experience of adjustment to life on comparatively small island land areas. But even here there are significant differences between those who live on high islands of volcanic origin and those who inhabit low coral atolls. The former are found particularly in the Marianas and western Carolines, while the Marshallese and eastern Carolinians are mostly atoll-dwellers.

This distinction leads to very different life styles and differing group interests. Water supply, for example, is a constant problem on Majuro, the administrative center for the Marshalls District, in a manner unknown on Ponape or Kusaie. The ability of most low islands to sustain population is severely limited, and even modest population increases face many with the prospect of migration or starvation. Ponape or Saipan, on the other hand, could accommodate their own normal growth for years in the future and are considered areas of potential colonization for surplus population from smaller islands.

For many atoll dwellers, such migration is difficult, however, as the case of the displaced Bikinians has dramatized. The feeling of alienation from home territory is very keen for those who have lived in such close communion with the meager soil, the atoll lagoon, and the open sea around it. This is true even when new neighbors may be hospitable and not too different in appearance and ways. The distances between islands and the difficulties of travel have tended over the years to foster local, rather than general loyalties, which makes administration or nation-building difficult.

Another source of diversity among Trust Territory inhabitants springs from their experience with alien rule. Today, the United States administers the area through six administrative districts: the Marianas (except Guam), the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and the Western Caroline or Palau District. In general, this follows patterns used by the Japanese and Germans earlier and is based on geographic rather than ethnic divisions. Yet there is a degree of ethnic cohesion around the administrative centers of each district, which fades toward the more remote

islands. The Spaniards, Germans and Japanese made varying degrees of incursion upon native ways, generally (as with United States rule) concentrating their influence for change close to the administrative centers. The foreign impact has been greatest in the Marianas, as a group, and least in the Marshalls.

The Germans, for example, found Yap useful as a communications center, but they had little need or desire to meddle in Yapese politics, land tenure, or in Yap's peculiarly conservative ways. The Japanese, on the other hand, sought a more intensive exploitation of the resources of the northern Marianas and the Palau group, in particular, and this drive occasioned considerable interference with traditional ways there. Thriving towns sprang up on Koror, in the Palaus, and on Saipan, in the Marianas, where the authority of the chiefs was set aside and the indigenous population was allowed to participate on the fringes of an imported economy. The islanders acquired tastes for imported goods and in some cases abandoned their own production techniques and self-reliance.

When the Americans took over, the effect upon intensively developed islands like sugar-planted Saipan was disastrous. The repatriation of Japanese workers left only small villages in what had been sizeable towns. The dismantling of military installations left no similar employment in the foreigners' enterprises. Some islanders were thrust rudely backward to an earlier stage of their own civilization, and in a good many cases they had lost either the desire or the ability to revive the traditional culture.

On the islands more remote from the administrative or economic centers the impact of change was less noticeable. Yet even here a return to pre-war or pre-Japanese ways was impossible. From the American standpoint, the restoration of traditional societies—with disease, infanticide and inter-tribal warfare as crude but essential population controls—was unthinkable. Even the semi-despotic rule of traditional chiefs grated on the sensibilities of American administrative officers.

They knew that the revelation of such conditions under the rule of a country supposedly devoted to a democratic way of life would raise a furor, nationally and internationally. "Progress," then, was decreed by an American sense of responsibility, as well as by Micronesian needs.

U.S. NAVY POLICY

American policy toward the peoples of the Trust Territory, to begin with, was largely Navy policy, built around a primary concern with strategic considerations and drawing on years of experience in ruling American Samoa and Guam. In those years, it was possible to decree the removal of nearly all the Japanese-imported population without major concern for the impact of this removal on the economic life of the islanders. Under military control, it was possible to designate Bikini, Eniwetok and Kwajalein as sites for military experiments and exercises, removing or basically disrupting the lives of the inhabitants. Twenty years later the effects of these actions were plaguing civilian administrators who were concerned with the plight of the Bikinians, who still wanted to return home, and with the "tropical slum" of Ebeye, an island bedroom suburb for those who flocked to the military employment opportunities on nearby Kwajalein.

The Navy was not exclusively at fault for shortcomings in American achievement prior to 1951. Congressional budget limitations and the absence of any large interest group really concerned with the inhabitants gave little incentive for a different policy. In fact, there were basic differences of view among the few Americans really concerned with the Micronesians or with American responsibilities toward them. One school of thought emphasized the right of self-determination of the island peoples in matters of local government and the "non-political" aspects of their lives. Several anthropologists, for example, insisted that it was neither our duty nor our right to try to make modern Americans out of Pacific islanders. This "zoo" or "anthropological garden" approach also had the political virtue of calling for only very

limited budgets and minimal administrative apparatus.

Others held that it was the responsibility of the United States to raise the standard of living and of literacy of the people of the Trust Territory and to prepare them for responsible, united and, to some extent, democratic self-rule. They had on their side the terms of the Trusteeship agreement of 1947, as modified at the insistence of several U.N. powers, including the Soviet Union. They also had the support of the general tide of anticolonial sentiment represented by the newly independent nations in the international body. Representatives of these countries gave willing ears to the Micronesian spokesmen who complained of inadequate United States aid and slow progress toward self-government.

The "development" group steadily gained in influence, and new steps were begun in the late 1950's toward implementing pledges of economic and political improvement in the Trust Territory. It was not until the 1960's, however, that a major breakthrough in appropriations and policy took place. Then new emphasis was given to school-building, teacher-training, public health and sanitation projects, still greatly needed, and improvement in inter-island communications.

THE PEACE CORPS

Late in 1966, Peace Corps volunteers were sent to the Trust Territory, a "backward area under United States rule," as John Griffin has called it. What the Peace Corps people found was an area in which bureaucratic forces seemed to stand in the way of necessary, rapid change. Members of the Trust Territory administration resented criticism from "instant experts" with idealistic standards and no real sense of administrative realities and problems. The Corps people, in the view of one sympathetic and experienced observer, Honolulu newspaperman John Griffin, made their own mistakes, based on bureaucratic empire-building, particularly in rushing in more than 600 volunteers, a larger concentration than had been attempted anywhere in the world. Despite real prog-

ress under High Commissioner William Norwood, Interior staffers were cast in the light of foot-draggers when they were unable to support all the proposals of these eager and willing workers.

And the Micronesians? As might have been expected, their reactions varied. Some welcomed the aid of Peace Corps lawyers and the editors of the *Micronesian Monthly*, particularly their efforts to put pressure for change on the administration. Some young, ambitious Micronesians resented those who were sent among their people with little in the way of preparation. They regarded the volunteers as possible rivals to their own hopes for place and prestige. Some older people resented the increased pressure for change from traditional ways that the Americans seemed to be intensifying. An already serious generation gap in island societies seemed to be aggravated.

On balance it appears that the Peace Corps workers have done much more good than harm, and some efforts to curtail their work, notably in the lawyer category, have been opposed by the Micronesians. The Peace Corps certainly quickened the pace of local development programs, particularly in outlying areas, and workers helped attract attention in Washington to the needs of the Territory. Ironically, the very mistakes of the Peace Corps members may have served to humanize the American image in Micronesia.

As both American and Micronesian observers have noted, the breakthrough in United States policy in the 1960's followed the major involvement of the United States in Vietnam, just as the replacement of Navy by Department of Interior control in 1951 had followed the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The strategic interest, responsible for our trusteeship in the first place, is still the underlying motivation of the United States. Very recently, the prospect of a phase-out in Vietnam and the withdrawal or limitation of United States military activities in Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines has given rise to another wave of Washington interest in the Trust Territory as a possible new strategic frontier.

A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS?

At this point, a conflict between strategic concerns and the ongoing promotion of the well-being and self-determination of the Trust Territory population reappears. U.N. inspection teams have criticized the administration in the past for failure to push education fast enough and for using an educational program to "Americanize" the Micronesians. The administration has introduced English into the growing number of elementary and secondary schools of the Territory as a means of increasing the sense of unity among at least the younger generation by giving them a *lingua franca*. The curriculum has also been designed in part with the idea of giving young people all over the area some basis of common experience and knowledge. Yet the possibility that such a program may disguise a subtle program of indoctrination toward permanent affiliation with the United States has concerned some Micronesian leaders as well as critics in the United Nations.

Members of one of the latest U.N. teams also expressed concern that American economic policies seem to be more concerned with United States control than with Micronesian development. Administration rules hamper foreign investments in the islands, yet Congress maintains tariffs against Trust Territory exports of canned fish, for example, to the United States. It was suggested that both tariff and investment policies might be altered to allow Micronesian enterprise to secure capital as well as goods in the cheapest market and to find wider outlets for its product.

Obviously, the Japanese are ready to take advantage of such opportunities, as their rising trade and tourist business (to say nothing of off-shore fishing activity) demonstrate. But here again security considerations intervene. Military reliance on bases in an area the economy of which was dominated from abroad would be dangerous. Despite current friendly relations with Japan, the success of "yen diplomacy" in the Territory is seen as a potential threat.

The hard fact is that without outside economic assistance the Trust Territory has

little prospect of achieving and maintaining nationhood in today's world. The mineral resources of the islands offer no adequate base for a modern national economy, at least at present levels of world technology. The soil of the area is insufficient, in area or in fertility, to offer the prospect of a thriving agriculture-based economy. More intensive use of the land can obviously be made, notably in the Marianas, Palaus and Ponape. But such development, as Japanese experience demonstrated, would call for large importations and in the short run imported labor as well. The fishing potential of Trust Territory waters could also be more intensively exploited, but again there is no evidence that the Micronesians are yet prepared, with initiative or with capital, to take on this deep-sea enterprise, especially in competition with the Japanese, who are already in the field though blocked from use of any island bases.

As recent economic studies commissioned by the administration have revealed, the major hope for economic advancement in the area in the near future seems to lie in tourism, military bases or other types of change which will demand large increases in foreign investment and influence. Such a price many Micronesians are unwilling, at this point, to pay. Reliance for the present, then, seems likely to be placed upon a relatively slow growth of tourism in limited areas. Air Micronesia, a combination of Continental Airlines, Hawaii-based Aloha Airlines, and some Micronesian capital, has promised to build hotels in each of the six administrative districts. But the conservative Yapese have announced opposition to such a development there, and representatives of other districts have qualifications. Meanwhile, the success of the "Royal Taga" hotel at Saipan, built by a Guamanian capitalist, will be watched closely.

The great bulk of the money economy of the Trust Territory today depends upon public funds introduced and controlled through the administration. That means that the economy is vulnerable to the vagaries of Washington politics, underscoring the de-

pendent position of the Micronesians. Economy moods in Congress or the fiscal demands of military involvements may cut off promising programs of agricultural experiments in Ponape, school-building in Truk, or the improvement of inter-island transportation.

The removal of the exceptionally capable and popular High Commissioner William Norwood early in 1968 was patently for reasons of partisan politics. His replacement, Edward E. Johnston, was former head of the Republican state organization in Hawaii and a man without any specific training or experience for the Trust Territory job. (The same, by the way, might have been said of Norwood at the time he was appointed.) Fortunately, Johnston is a very capable administrator and, more important, a man thoroughly sympathetic to the Micronesians. Like his predecessor, he has made a point of traveling widely among the islands, a task likely to acquaint anyone with the shortcomings of the communications system. Only recently, in fact, was the High Commissioner put in direct touch with Washington by phone. Previously he had to try to get passage to Guam, the nearest through wire center.

Norwood had brought the very capable Ponapean, Leo Falcam, to Saipan as Special Assistant to the High Commissioner. Johnston has continued Falcam in that post and has continued the effort to include more Micronesians in high administrative positions. The Congress of Micronesia, which held its first meeting in 1965, has come to represent a powerful and widely respected voice. Still subject to the High Commissioner's veto and ultimate control from Washington, the Congress has reached a status where its strongly held views will be difficult to override for any but major reasons. Both legislative and administrative office-holders are gaining valuable experience for the first steps in self-government. Though there are inevitable local jealousies of those with American-style education and American-regime positions, these would appear to be normal growing pains involved in the development of the kind of infrastructure needed to sustain a modern, self-governing com-

munity. They appear likely to diminish as the younger generation takes over.

The report of the Future Political Status Commission, appointed by the Congress of Micronesia in 1967, was published in July, 1969. It is a shrewd and statesmanlike document which winds up with a recommendation that the Trust Territory seek a status of self-government, in free association with the United States. That is the first choice. The second is complete independence, to be sought in case satisfactory terms for the "free association" cannot be negotiated with Washington. Failure of such an agreement, however, is not expected by those who framed this proposal. After speaking of "the historically unique partnership" which has come to exist between Micronesia and the United States, the report states, ". . . In recommending free association with the United States, we seek not an end but a re-definition, renewal and improvement of this partnership."

If this sounds like idealistic rhetoric, there follows a down-to-earth assessment as to what the Micronesians have to offer the United States in return for protection and support. It is the use of their strategically placed islands in some form of military capacity, to be freely negotiated.

Our experience with the military has not always been encouraging [says the report] but as a self-governing state in free association with the United States, we would accept the necessity of such military needs and we would feel confident that we could enter into responsible negotiations with the military, endeavoring to meet American requirements while protecting our own interests.

Facing the risk of becoming a target area for the enemies of the United States in the event of a conflict among the powers, these Micronesian spokesmen point out that they

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Donald D. Johnson has taught at the University of Southern California, and the University of Connecticut, and has been a visiting lecturer at universities in Australia and New Zealand. He joined the University of Hawaii in 1949 and served as chairman of the history department from 1960-1964.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

President Nixon's Statement on the Pacific Area

On February 18, 1970, President Richard Nixon addressed Congress in a first "annual foreign affairs" message. Excerpts from the 119-page document follow:

... First, we remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia.

Second, behind the headlines of strife and turmoil, the fact remains that no region contains a greater diversity of vital and gifted peoples, and thus a greater potential for cooperative enterprises. Constructive nationalism and economic progress since World War II have strengthened the new nations of Asia internally. A growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian cooperation are creating a new and healthy pattern of international relationships in the region. Our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger responsibilities for the peaceful progress of the area. . . .

Third, while we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them, the changes taking place in that region enable us to change the character of our involvement. The responsibilities once borne by the United States at such great cost can now be shared. America *can* be effective in helping the peoples of Asia harness the forces of change to peaceful progress and in supporting them as they defend themselves from those who would subvert this process and fling Asia again into conflict. . . .

¶The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

¶We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

¶In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic

assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

This approach requires our commitment to helping our partners develop their own strength. In doing so, we must strike a careful balance. If we do too little to help them—and erode their belief in our commitments—they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence. . . .

The partnership we seek involves not only defense. Its ultimate goal must be equally close cooperation over a much broader range of concerns—economic as well as political and military. For in that close cooperation with our Asian friends lies our mutual commitment to peace in Asia and the world.

Our goal must be particularly close cooperation for economic development. Here too our most effective contribution will be to support Asian initiatives in an Asian framework. . . .

Japan, as one of the great industrial nations of the world, has a unique and essential role to play in the development of the new Asia. Our policy toward Japan during the past year demonstrates our conception of the creative partnership we seek with all Asian nations. . . .

Asian regional cooperation is at its beginning. We will confront subtle decisions as we seek to help maintain its momentum without supplanting Asian direction. . . .

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE PACIFIC NATIONS

JAPAN SURGES AHEAD. By P. B. STONE.
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
193 pages, tables, bibliography and index,
\$6.95.)

Stone's analysis of Japan's "economic miracle" will engender lively discussions in graduate schools of business administration. It is equally appropriate for political science classes and economics reading lists. The bright style and surprising information will interest and inform the general reader. Last—but perhaps first in importance—it should serve as a valuable handbook for developing countries.

O.E.S.

THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS. By MASAO MARUYAMA. EDITED BY IVAN MORRIS. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 348 pages, appendices and index, \$2.95.)

That a Japanese should understand Japan is not surprising; that he can interpret Japanese thought to Westerners with clarity and sensitivity is rare and welcome. While all of these essays were written before 1963, they provide insights valid for today. Maruyama's book is recommended to political scientists, psychologists and to the sophisticated general reader. The translations, by various people, are of a uniformly high level.

O.E.S.

HOW THE CONSERVATIVES RULE JAPAN. By NATHANIEL B. THAYER. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969. 318 pages, glossary, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

During his term as Press Attaché in the American Embassy in Tokyo, Thayer developed a close working relationship with many key Japanese politicians. From

numerous interviews Thayer has produced an interesting study of the rebirth of party politics in Japan after the end of World War II. He examines in close detail the role of the political leader in party factions, the way decisions are reached and implemented, the interrelation of political parties and the business community, as well as some fascinating details on post-war elections.

This study will be a valuable resource for political scientists and for any diplomat or industrialist concerned with Japanese affairs.

O.E.S.

MODERN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. By MORINOSUKE KAJIMA. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1969. 312 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$5.50.)

Kajima is a member of the Upper House of the Diet, and has served in the Foreign Office, and as a publisher, author and translator. The essays collected here span some 15 years. They are personal reflections on political affairs affecting Japan and are written very much in the first person. There is very little solid substance for the scholar and few insights that would stimulate the general reader.

O.E.S.

NEW ZEALAND. By KEITH JACKSON AND JOHN HARRÉ. (New York: Walker and Company, 1969. 193 pages, appendices and index, \$6.50.)

Jackson and Harré have combined their training and experience in political science, history and anthropology to provide an excellent history of New Zealand. Too little known to American students, New Zealand comes through these pages as a vital and interesting country; a country with serious problems which are being faced with equanimity and confidence.

This book is a useful addition to Walker's "Nations and Peoples Library."

O.E.S.

THE PHILIPPINES. By RAYMOND NELSON. (New York: Walker and Company, 1969. 162 pages, appendices and index, \$6.50.)

This is a sound, comprehensive history of the Philippines. It is suitable for high school students, but is written with sufficient economic, political and anthropological detail to be of value to college students and general readers. Maps and photographs illuminate the text.

O.E.S.

NEW ZEALAND'S RECORD IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Edited by ANGUS ROSS. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1969. 341 pages, appendices and index, \$8.50.)

There is material available on New Zealand's role in the development of her native Maori population, but this is the first study we have seen which undertakes to explain and evaluate New Zealand's colonial administration of her island dependencies—the Cook Islands, Niue and Western Samoa. The studies, which cover land policies, education and economic development policies, are sound, clear and objective. They are also replete with fascinating detail. This book can stand as the definitive study of its subject—and as a model for other works of its kind.

O.E.S.

MISCELLANEOUS

SEEDS OF CHANGE: THE GREEN REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's. By LESTER R. BROWN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. 196 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

In these days of gloomy forecasts and dire warnings of mankind's future, this is a decidedly cheery book. Brown is not writing bright Pollyanna phrases from congenital optimism; rather he is describing from first-hand experience the enor-

mous changes for the better in food grain production since 1944.

The author has spent his working life in the field of foreign agricultural policy and has seen at first hand much of the exciting change which is described in this book. The work of the Rockefeller Foundation in turning Mexico from a food deficit (and hungry) nation into an exporter of wheat and corn through development and use of dwarf hybrid strains of seed grain started a quiet revolution which may, in time, prove to be more important than many noisier and better known revolutions.

Encouraged by the Mexican experience, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations joined forces to support development of a rice strain which would do for Asian countries what wheat had done for Mexico. The International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, producing first the IR-8 and later the IR-5 strains, has multiplied yields of this grain many times in the Philippines, in Pakistan and other Asian countries.

Brown considers in some detail the related problems of population growth, employment levels, nutritional standards and the economic strains on developing countries. He is realistic in his assessments of the hazards involved, but hopeful that with intelligent self-interest on the part of wealthy nations rich and poor together can work out a promising future for mankind.

O.E.S.

AGAINST THE WORLD: ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOUTH AFRICA. By DOUGLAS BROWN. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books (paper), 1969. 253 pages and index, \$1.45.)

Douglas Brown has scored a notable success in handling an emotion-laden topic with understanding, sympathy and realism. Deeply disapproving of apartheid, he is nevertheless able to give the reader a vivid sense of past and present. Polemics are subordinated to reason. The book is profoundly depressing reading.

O.E.S.

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THE UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER

(Continued from page 195)

in the Pacific area is enhanced by our alliance with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand in the ANZUS pact, but is offset in part by our political-military obligations to South Korea, to Taiwan, to the Philippines and to Thailand.

LIMITATIONS OF POWER

If the United States is a political-military power in the Pacific, it has learned, over the past two decades, that great political-military power has its limitations. These are often self-imposed under the pressure of external events and after weighing the consequences of the vigorous use of political-military power. Basically the United States has learned, or should have learned, that there is probably no proper mixture of political-military-economic power that will enable a big power to reorder the lives and politics of weak states in its own image. It has also learned that a very large territory and a huge population impose all kinds of strains on a regime attempting to modernize such a state and to make it an equal with the two super-powers. In 1970, it is still a question whether a central government in China will be able to care for its huge population, modernize its economy and develop a stable political system. These lessons in Vietnam and China underlie the Nixon administration's desire to disengage from Vietnam, to return Okinawa to Japan and to adopt a "low posture" foreign policy in the Asian-Pacific area.

Whether the United States, as a Pacific power, will be able to disengage successfully from the continent of Asia, hold its political-military power for circumspect use and shift the main burden of security to the Asian states themselves while at the same time it undertakes those steps necessary to build a more peaceful Pacific in the 1970's is in question. The actual and potential crisis situations in the Asia-Pacific area seem legion. The Sino-Soviet dispute (which could erupt

into war), the status of the two Koreas, the unsettled status of Kashmir, the future of the two Vietnams, and continued low-level insurgencies in the Philippines, on the Malaysian-Thai border, in Burma and in the Indian northeast, to name just a few, are situations that could erupt at any time into a conflict in which the interests and policies of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China would be intimately involved.

Added to these actual and potential crisis situations is the fact that almost all the new states of Asia are beset by massive internal economic and political problems, still a long way from solution. A further economic and/or political disintegration of any one of the new states in Asia or of China herself could drastically affect the international relations of all states in the area and the triangular relations of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China.

The international environment of the vast Asian-Pacific area is uncertain and unpredictable. It is within this unstable environment that the United States as a Pacific power must chart its course for the 1970's. The policy-makers of the Nixon administration have a far harder task in avoiding the shoals and reefs than did the early American sailing masters in the Pacific Ocean. Yet the responsibility cannot be avoided because the United States is the primary military power in the Pacific area.

THE U.S.-JAPANESE TREATY CRISIS

(Continued from page 208)

United States will continue to clash with the growing concern of Japan and other Asian countries to assert national interests. Should the United States fail to respond with a fresh approach, the 1970 security crisis may submit Japanese-American friendship to severe strains. But perhaps only a crisis is capable of forcing United States leaders to respect Japan as a sovereign nation rather than as a mere adjunct to their interests in the Western Pacific.

THE PHILIPPINES UNDER MARCOS

(Continued from page 201)

groupings, ASPAC and ASEAN. It also still belongs to SEATO and is the headquarters site of the Asian Development Bank. It is also non-Communist East Asia's third most populous country (led only by Indonesia and Japan) and is very strategically situated.

Given future domestic stability, it could be a key country in the new evolving Asian-Western Pacific balance of power. If the Philippines' internal problems get out of hand, however—particularly if there is the revolution that almost everybody predicts—the Philippines could even pose a threat to several Asian-Pacific lands, especially if it is allied with a major hostile power.

AUSTRALIA AS AN INDO- PACIFIC POWER

(Continued from page 228)

some attendant political difficulties. The remaining passages, through the Indonesian archipelago or to the south of Australia are both under Australian influence or control. Australia is the great land bridge between the Indian and Pacific oceans. From these facts major strategic advantages can be derived, or at least denied to others, and consequently significant elements of influence can be exercised.

In sum, Australia has advantages of real diplomatic and political importance. She enjoys a geographic position giving her command or influence at sea passages of global importance and a significant position as a base for space exploration and tracking. She is a military power which, though very small by great power standards, is one of the more significant local forces in the South and East Asian regions. Her position is supported by a dramatically expanding economy; a membership in the South Asian region which gives her—unlike any other “Western” state—an insider's position; and economic and technical resources which could give her a

special role in regional development. And, not least important, Australia enjoys the intangibles of established friendship, mutual good will and ethnic and cultural ties with the United States. These are respectable assets with which to play an increasingly important role in the area in the 1970's.

NEW ZEALAND IN THE 1970'S

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forge closer direct links with Asian nations.

If in general New Zealanders see themselves as a mini-nation in a world of medium-to super-powers they in turn loom large in the eyes of the islanders to their north. Interest in these islands has seldom been great and there has often been a dearth of information about them. Nevertheless, New Zealand has made a substantial contribution to important developments there. Western Samoa has been brought to independence together with (for all practical purposes) the Cook Islands. New Zealand's advice is sought and given, and many islanders move to live in Auckland, now the largest Polynesian urban area anywhere. A strong case can be made for the concentration of New Zealand's overseas aid exclusively to these underdeveloped territories. Because of long contact and the efforts of scholars, New Zealanders probably have a more thoroughgoing understanding of the nature of the social, economic and political systems in this area than any other nation. Here New Zealand has a special responsibility.

In effect, therefore, the 1960's saw a major upheaval in New Zealand's policies. The traditional norms have largely ceased to exist while the main lines of New Zealand's development in the 1970's are still not clear. It is possible, for example, that even New Zealand's viability as an independent unit could be threatened because of her size and economic vulnerability. One thing, however, is certain. The steadily growing relationship with her Pacific neighbors which has characterized the last decade is now an irreversible process.

THE TWO KOREAS

(Continued from page 216)

quired 14 years of off-and-on negotiations to agree on the terms of normalization, of which the most important was Japan's pledge of \$800 million to South Korea—\$300 million in outright grants, \$200 million in government loans, and \$300 million in private commercial credits. Significantly, however, payment was to be made not in cash but in Japanese goods and services over a 10-year period.

Japan has since become South Korea's number two trading partner—second only to the United States—and has made an appreciable contribution to her economic growth. One of the avowed goals of South Korea's foreign policy in 1970 is further to strengthen her ties with Japan. The latter for her part has reassured Seoul that she considers the security of South Korea essential to her own security and that she will provide military bases and facilities in the event of renewed Communist aggression in Korea.

In brief, the two Koreas are vigorously pursuing the same goals—unity and change—and yet their ultimate aims are poles apart. The North seeks unity under Red banners, while the South strives for unity free from Communist influence. Fearing a possible invasion from the other, each side has built up and is continually fortifying formidable defensive and offensive capabilities.

By and large, perceived self-interest more than unrestrained passion appears to have guided the respective foreign policies of both North and South. But a miscalculation on Kim Il-sŏng's part may well spark a new crisis—and even a conflagration. Barring radical changes either in East-West relations or in the political complexion of either regime, the Korean peninsula is likely to remain not only divided but under the perennial shadow of a fratricidal war from which the four major Pacific powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China—certainly will not be able to remain aloof.

THE FUTURE OF NORTH VIETNAM

(Continued from page 232)

This means that Giap's forces must be prepared to move on short notice, and they will apparently not move from relatively secure bases until small, special action elements who have previously been infiltrated deep behind enemy lines, mainly into the cities, have created the confusion and momentary disorganization that favors such a forward move.

In view of the wide differences that separate them on many basic issues, the D.R.V.'s major allies, the Soviet Union and China, have understandably been unable to bring their views on Hanoi's strategy much closer together. While both continue to furnish Hanoi with material support, the Russians, pressed by the restless East Europeans, have been more anxious to have Hanoi attempt to negotiate a settlement with the United States and have accused the Chinese of counseling Hanoi to prolong the fighting, thus making use of Vietnam for their own ulterior purposes.⁴ Peking, for its part, has until recently been very cold to the D.R.V.'s decision to begin talks with the United States, probably because it feels that the negotiations give the Russians too great a measure of influence in Hanoi. In November, 1969, however, the ambassador of a Western country having diplomatic relations with Peking reported to his government that Peking was now willing to see a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war, provided that this did not result from an American-Russian agreement made over the heads of the North Vietnamese.⁵ This change of attitude on Peking's part appears to have been the result of Hanoi's success in demonstrating its determination to avoid succumbing to anything resembling Russian pressure, and also the result of the tactical diplomatic victory scored by Hanoi in having the P.R.G. sitting at the same conference table with the United States,

⁴ Soviet Chinese-language broadcast, Aug. 4, 1969.

⁵ Private information to the writer.

which permitted the D.R.V. leaders to point to a positive gain to be derived from negotiations with the imperialists.

Hanoi continues to balance its compliments to Moscow and Peking, to avoid offending either. In October, 1969, Pham Van Dong at the head of a D.R.V. delegation and Nguyen Huu Tho at the head of a P.R.G. delegation were guests of honor at Peking's national day celebrations and afterwards paid state visits to the Soviet Union. It was as if the 61-year-old Dong had wished to convey to the Soviet and Chinese leaders that the Vietnamese Communists still deserved the same consideration despite the disappearance of an old comrade-in-arms who had been senior to them both. And this, for a small country that has a tiger by the tail and cannot let go, is a matter of vital importance.

THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

(Continued from page 239)

would be equally exposed in their present dependent status, and even independence would not offer any sure guarantee of immunity from invasion. As citizens of a self-governing state making their own terms, the people of the present Trust Territory would be "far more prepared to face these prospects" than under the "degrading conditions of prolonged quasi-colonial status."

Considering independence and the consequent loss of United States economic support, the Status Commission concluded that economic hardship would result, despite increased prospects of aid from Japan, the Soviet Union, or other sources, including the United Nations. Payment of these costs, however, would be preferable to indefinite continuation of the present status, in their expressed view. Dependent attachment to any other administering power they reject.

The United States agreement with the U.N. seems to commit us to a common policy toward all the islands in the matter of future political status. This would stand in the way of such a disposition as has been suggested from Saipan, uniting the northern Marianas

with Guam as a part of the United States, perhaps as part of the state of Hawaii. Another proposal has been to combine Guam, the Trust Territory and American Samoa into a common political entity within the American union. Still another envisions some sort of Pacific island nation combining these with the British-ruled Gilberts, the Australian-controlled islands and the independent states of Western Samoa, Tonga and Nauru.

In all such proposals, the familiar obstacles of distance and cultural and linguistic diversity which face the Trust Territory appear in magnified form. And the variations in present states of economic and political development merely increase. It is probably good that political awareness of this sort is developing both among Pacific islanders and among responsible Americans concerned with them. Whatever the solution or the path chosen in the years immediately ahead, what now appears certain is the fact that the islanders themselves will play a major role. Any United States policy which fails to take account of their wishes in the supposed interest of military security will be building upon a dangerously unsound foundation.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 242)

SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A BIRTHRIGHT. BY MARY BENSON. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969. 286 pages, appendixes and index, \$5.95.)

Mary Benson was born in South Africa and has spent a lifetime waging vigorous resistance to the policies of apartheid. She knows from long personal association the actions, hopes and despair of black Africans. The book offers a wealth of detail hitherto little known outside Africa. While no attempt is made to seem impartial, the writer rests her case on carefully marshalled facts.

O.E.S.

The Month In Review

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of February, 1970, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

Feb. 11—Western diplomatic sources in West Germany report that a Soviet note to Western Allied representatives in West Berlin calls for negotiations at the ambassadorial level to deal with "violations" of the 4-power agreement on West Berlin.

Feb. 27—In virtually identical notes, the governments of the U.S., Britain and France inform the U.S.S.R. that they are ready to begin 4-power talks on problems of Berlin.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Feb. 6—A 3-year non-preferential, nondiscriminatory trade agreement is signed between the E.E.C. and Yugoslavia. This is the E.E.C.'s first agreement with an East European country.

Feb. 7—Common Market conferees agree to aid French farmers. This aid is a precondition to France's agreement to discuss British entry into the Market.

Feb. 13—A 5-year preferential tariff agreement is reached between the E.E.C. and Israel on the exchange of industrial and farm products.

Middle East Crisis

Feb. 2—Fighting between Israeli and Syrian troops breaks out on the Golan Heights. Tanks and artillery join in the heaviest fighting since the June, 1967, war.

Feb. 7—Officials of the U.A.R., Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Sudan meet in Cairo to plan war strategy against Israel.

Feb. 10—Grenades thrown by 3 Arab terrorists at the Munich (West Germany) airport kill one person and wound 23. The grenades are thrown at an airport bus and

into the lounge among passengers waiting to board an El Al flight to Israel.

Feb. 12—Israeli planes strike a factory in a Cairo suburb, killing 70 people.

An agreement is reached between King Hussein of Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian commando groups to end tension between the commandos and the Jordanian Army.

Feb. 17—Munich police thwart an attempt by 3 armed Arabs to hijack an El Al aircraft.

Feb. 21—A Swiss aircraft bound for Israel explodes in mid-air over Zurich, killing all 47 aboard. It is reported that a bomb concealed in mail addressed to Israel was planted aboard the craft by Arab terrorists.

War in Vietnam

Feb. 5—North Vietnamese missile sites are attacked by U.S. bombers after unarmed U.S. reconnaissance planes are fired on.

Feb. 7—Fighting begins again after a 24-hour cease-fire for *Tet*, the Lunar New Year holiday.

Feb. 11—North Vietnamese representatives to the Paris peace talks announce they will hold no more secret talks with the U.S. until the U.S. appoints a representative of "elevated rank" to replace Henry Cabot Lodge, who resigned December 11, 1969. Since that date, the U.S. has been represented by an acting head of delegation.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Feb. 16—Japanese steel companies report that their representatives are negotiating in Peking for additional sales to the Chinese government. Sales are expected to exceed the previously established 1.2 mil-

lion tons by at least an additional 500,000 tons.

CONGO (Kinshasa)

Feb. 18—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers tells a conference of U.S. Ambassadors to African countries in Kinshasa that the U.S. identifies itself with the "unfinished business" of securing greater political freedom for blacks living in the white-ruled nations of southern Africa. Rogers says the U.S. will not take a direct role in liberation movements. He is on a tour of 10 African nations.

COSTA RICA

Feb. 2—Nearly final returns from national elections held yesterday give José Figueres Ferrer an impressive lead for the presidency. Figueres' National Liberation party appears likely to maintain a narrow majority control of the Assembly.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Feb. 3—The Central Committee of the Communist party orders interviews with all 1.5 million party members in order to weed out those who supported the liberalization movement in 1968.

Feb. 15—The autonomy of Slovakia under the Czechoslovak government, which was won in 1969, is being restricted, according to a report in *The New York Times*. The U.S.S.R. is known to have objected to the move for greater autonomy when it was granted.

ETHIOPIA

Feb. 11—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers meets with Emperor Haile Selassie on Rogers' 10-nation African tour. In Addis Ababa, Rogers meets with visiting Yugoslav President Tito to discuss problems of the Middle East.

FRANCE

Feb. 8—At the congress of the French Communist party Roger Garaudy, who has been a leading party theorist for many years, is dropped from the Central Committee for his criticism of the Warsaw Pact

countries' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Feb. 10—The government announces the signing of an agreement to sell 30 *Mirage* fighter planes to Spain.

Feb. 24—President Georges Pompidou, in the U.S. on an 8-day visit, tells a gathering on the White House lawn that France wants to strengthen her ties with the U.S. and wants the U.S. to keep a military and economic presence in Europe. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, Feb. 23, 25.)

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Germany, West*)

Feb. 12—Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany is invited to East Berlin to meet with Premier Willi Stoph to discuss a possible treaty between the two Germanies.

Feb. 19—The official press agency publishes a statement charging that Brandt's offer of "open-ended" talks fails to meet East German demands for full recognition.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Germany, East*)

Feb. 1—A long-term agreement is signed by West German and Soviet trade officials arranging for the exchange of German steel pipes for Soviet natural gas. A pipeline will be built to carry gas from Siberia to the West German border.

Feb. 6—West German representatives meet with Polish and with Soviet representatives to work for better relations between the respective countries.

Feb. 18—An offer to meet with East German Premier Willi Stoph between March 9 and March 22 is made by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt proposes the talks to explore the possibility of finding common ground for future agreement between the two governments.

GHANA

Feb. 21—During a 24-hour visit to Ghana, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers

tells Prime Minister Kofi A. Busia that the U.S. will consider making a \$15-million development loan to aid the country's economy.

GUYANA

Feb. 23—Prime Minister Forbes Burnham declares Guyana a Cooperative Republic within the British Commonwealth. Guyana, which gained her independence in May, 1966, will have a President as head of state in place of the Governor General, Queen Elizabeth's representative.

INDIA

(See also *Pakistan*)

Feb. 10—The Bank Nationalization Act, passed in July, 1969, is overruled by the Supreme Court as "hostile discrimination," since it applied only to 14 large private banks and excluded all others.

Feb. 14—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renationalizes the country's 14 largest private banks by presidential ordinance. The ordinance includes certain amendments which are intended to meet the objections of the Supreme Court.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. European Economic Community, Middle East Crisis; Switzerland*)

Feb. 22—Following a long Cabinet meeting, the government calls on civil airlines and nations around the world to end the terrorist attacks against aircraft bound for Israel. 14 Israelis were among the 47 killed aboard a Swiss aircraft that was blown up over Zurich yesterday.

Feb. 23—Two Americans are wounded and one is killed by guerrilla shots fired from ambush at a tourist bus in occupied Jerusalem. The bus, carrying American Baptists on a Holy Land tour, was near Hebron when the attack occurred.

ITALY

Feb. 7—The minority Cabinet of Premier Mariano Rumor's Christian Democratic government resigns. Rumor hopes to form a coalition government with broad left-center representation.

Feb. 28—The caretaker Premier, Mariano Rumor, gives up his attempt to form a new coalition. If the deadlock continues, Parliament will be dissolved and new elections called.

JAPAN

Feb. 3—Japan becomes the 95th nation to sign the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi says that ratification will not be rushed.

Feb. 13—Defense Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposes joint U.S.-Japanese use of military bases in Japan.

Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda announces that Japan is planning to give \$1.4 billion in foreign aid to developing countries, making Japan second only to the U.S. in such assistance.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Feb. 2—The North Korean representative on the Korean Military Armistice Commission refuses to release 51 South Koreans who were on a plane hijacked to North Korea December 11, 1969.

Feb. 14—39 of the 51 passengers from the hijacked plane are released by North Korea; they return to Seoul after 65 days of captivity. The remaining 12 are still held in North Korea.

LAOS

Feb. 13—Two North Vietnamese divisions drive Laotian government forces from positions in the Plaine des Jarres.

Feb. 17—Despite intensive bombing by U.S. B-52's, North Vietnamese forces seize half of the Plaine des Jarres.

Feb. 21—The last government positions on the Plaine des Jarres are abandoned to North Vietnamese battalions.

Feb. 25—U.S. B-52's continue heavy attacks in the Plaine des Jarres. The planes are attempting to destroy Laotian-American airbases and supplies which had to be abandoned to advancing North Vietnamese troops.

LESOTHO

- Feb. 1—Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan orders the imprisonment of 30 opposition Congress party leaders. Jonathan declared a state of emergency after the January 27 election, which the opposition appeared to be winning.
- Feb. 5—Five opposition publications are banned by Jonathan, who continues to rule by decree.

MOROCCO

- Feb. 7—U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers arrives in Rabat at the start of a 10-nation African tour. Rogers says his only interest is to "bring peace to this part of the world."

NIGERIA

- Feb. 19—U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, in Lagos on a 10-nation African tour, tells Nigeria that the U.S. "respects" Nigerian relief plans for former Biafran regions.

PAKISTAN

- Feb. 28—Talks between India and Pakistan on distribution of water from the Ganges River reach a deadlock on plans for the Farakka Dam.

PHILIPPINES

- Feb. 4—President Ferdinand E. Marcos tells an interviewer that demonstrations by students help him in his fight against corruption in government, but that violence must stop.
- Feb. 7—Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Vincente Raval resigns following charges of excessive police brutality during a demonstration the last week in January, 1970.
- Feb. 11—Following a meeting between President Marcos and militant leaders of labor and student groups, a scheduled demonstration is canceled. Marcos agrees to several demands from the demonstrators.
- Feb. 18—The U.S. embassy in Manila is attacked by rioting groups. Windows and furniture are smashed, but no embassy employees are injured.

- Feb. 26—20 people are injured as groups of demonstrators hurl rocks and firebombs. Police drive the rioters from the United States embassy.

SENEGAL

- Feb. 26—Abdou Diouf is named Premier by President Leopold Senghor following adoption of a new constitution which reintroduces the office of Premier.

SWITZERLAND

(See also *Middle East Crisis*)

- Feb. 23—Following the mid-air explosion of a Swiss aircraft bound for Tel Aviv, Swiss authorities impose drastic restrictions on Arab visitors seeking admission to the country.

TUNISIA

- Feb. 10—U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers receives a reportedly cool but correct welcome in Tunisia on his 10-nation African tour. Premier Bahi Ladgham tells Rogers that U.S. sale of aircraft to Israel is a "provocation" to Arab countries.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Laos*)

- Feb. 16—The Soviet news agency *Tass* issues a statement promising to supply Arab countries with additional military weapons.
- Feb. 28—The official news agency *Tass* prints a note from the government warning the U.S. against U.S. bombing in Laos.

U.A.R.

- Feb. 18—Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad addresses notes to all countries with which the U.A.R. has diplomatic relations. The notes attack the U.S. for selling planes to Israel.

UNITED KINGDOM

British Territories

Bermuda

- Feb. 6—The colony converts its currency to the dollar as it adopts the decimal system.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Feb. 2—Federal District Judge Charles R. Scott refuses to grant Governor Claude R. Kirk of Florida a hearing on the issue of forced busing of school children. The judge warns the governor not to interfere with the court's plans to desegregate two Florida school districts.

Feb. 6—Attorney General John N. Mitchell says that the government is filing 3 suits against 14 real estate companies in Memphis and Atlanta for practicing blockbusting.

Feb. 8—The governors of four Southern states, John Bell Williams of Mississippi, Lester G. Maddox of Georgia, Albert P. Brewer of Alabama and John J. McKeithen of Louisiana meet to protest the court-ordered desegregation of the schools in the South. The governors protest what they claim are double standards for schools in the South and those in the rest of the nation.

Feb. 9—George P. Shultz, Secretary of Labor, announces that the Philadelphia Plan will be extended to 18 other cities if they do not devise their own plans for ending job discrimination in the construction industry. (See *Current History Annual 1970*, p. 69.)

Feb. 11—Superior Court Judge Alfred E. Gitelson issues a ruling ordering the Los Angeles, California, school system to present plans for the integration of the district's 555 schools by June 1. The plans are to go into effect by September, 1970, and under no circumstances later than September, 1971.

Feb. 12—White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler tells reporters that President Nixon desires "to preserve, rather than destroy, the neighborhood school" and that the President "opposes compulsory busing of school children to achieve racial balance." A White House statement to this effect goes to Congress.

Feb. 13—Governor Nelson Rockefeller of

New York announces that local labor unions and the construction industry have agreed on a program to hire and train minority workers on the construction of a new state university campus. Construction work has been halted since March, 1969.

Feb. 16—President Nixon sets up an "informal Cabinet-level working group" to assist school districts to desegregate while maintaining the public education system. Vice President Spiro Agnew is chairman of the group; Secretary of Labor George Shultz is vice chairman. Other members are: Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Postmaster General Winton M. Blount, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch, Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity Donald Rumsfeld, and presidential counselors Daniel P. Moynihan and Bryce N. Harlow.

Feb. 17—Leon E. Panetta, director of the Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, resigns. Panetta implies that congressional pressures on the Administration are responsible for his resignation.

Federal Judge Damon J. Keith orders the complete integration of Pontiac, Michigan, schools by the fall of 1970.

Feb. 18—The Senate votes 56 to 36 to cut off federal aid to school districts that fail to desegregate, whether or not the racial imbalance is caused by residential patterns.

The seven defendants in the conspiracy trial arising from the riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 are cleared of plotting to incite a riot, but five of them are convicted of seeking to promote riot through individual acts. Those convicted are: David T. Dellinger, Rennie C. Davis, Jerry C. Rubin, Abbie Hoffman and Thomas F. Hayden.

Feb. 19—The House incorporates 3 "freedom-of-choice" and antibusing amendments in a \$19.4-billion health and education appropriations bill. The amendments are designed to restrict the government's power to use federal funds to enforce school desegregation. In a \$35-bil-

lion education authorization bill, the Senate includes a provision designed to prohibit the use of busing as part of federally approved school desegregation plans.

Feb. 20—Federal Judge Julius J. Hoffman sentences each of the 5 men convicted of crossing state lines to incite riots in Chicago to 5 years in prison.

Feb. 27—Robert E. Hampton, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, says administration pressure to increase the hiring of minority group members has been ended. He calls the pressure "discrimination in reverse."

Feb. 28—A memorandum prepared by presidential counselor Daniel P. Moynihan proposes "benign neglect" of the racial issue to quiet extremists in the white and black communities.

Conservation and Pollution

(See also *Government*)

Feb. 10—Officials of the Atomic Energy Commission begin meetings with a study group known as the Colorado Committee for Environmental Information. The Colorado committee, in a report, has contended that the Rocky Flats plant of the A.E.C. which manufactures atomic bombs has been releasing dangerously radioactive plutonium into the air, water and soil.

Feb. 14—The General Motors Corporation announces plans to develop automobile engines which will operate on lower octane, nonleaded gasoline. The new engines will be incorporated into all 1971 models.

Economy

Feb. 6—The Department of Labor reports that the unemployment rate for January, 1970, is 3.9 per cent. The figure for December, 1969, was 3.4 per cent.

The General Electric Corporation announces price increases on all General Electric and Hotpoint major appliances. The increases are attributed to rising manufacturing and distribution costs.

Feb. 13—The Federal Reserve Board reports a decline in industrial production in January, 1970, for the sixth consecutive month. The Commerce Department reports that personal income in January rose only \$2.4 billion; this is the smallest increase in two years.

Feb. 19—The Labor Department announces that after adjustments for normal seasonal developments, the Consumer Price Index rose 0.6 per cent in January.

Feb. 23—Secretary of Labor George Shultz tells the executive council of the A.F.L.—C.I.O. that the President plans to take "strong measures" in the event that there is a major increase in unemployment.

Foreign Policy

Feb. 1—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee makes public a report which questions whether the South Vietnamese Army would be able to withstand a heavy North Vietnamese attack after U.S. combat troops are withdrawn.

Feb. 3—It is announced at a ministerial meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in Venezuela that the United States has agreed to the formation of an inter-American negotiating unit on trade that will hear complaints about U.S. protectionism and consider possible U.S. trade concessions.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers meets with 11 Soviet newspaper editors who are visiting the U.S.

Feb. 4—It is reported in Washington that President Nixon has sent a note to Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union. The note reportedly asks the Soviet Union to enter into discussions of a limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East; stresses that the U.S. will continue efforts to encourage the observance of the United Nations cease-fire lines established after the 1967 war; and calls upon the Soviet Union to respond more affirmatively to proposals for Middle East peace made by the U.S. in October and December, 1969.

The State Department announces that

a meeting between the United States and Communist China has been scheduled in Poland for February 20.

President Nixon sends a message to the Inter-American Economic Conference meeting in Venezuela reporting that he has asked Congress for substantial new funds for Latin-American development.

Feb. 9—President Nixon nominates Stuart W. Rockwell to be Ambassador to Morocco.

Feb. 10—An agreement enlarging the cultural exchange programs between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for 1970 and 1971 is signed at the State Department.

Feb. 12—Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson issues a statement condemning Israel's bombing of an Egyptian scrap-metal plant and calling for Big Four efforts to reestablish a cease-fire line and limit arms shipments to the Middle East.

Feb. 13—President Nixon nominates Albert W. Sherer, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea.

Feb. 18—The President submits the first "annual report" on the state of the world to Congress. The foreign policy statement calls for a "durable peace" which is to be based on partnership with allies who "have the ability . . . to deal with local disputes which once might have required our intervention"; preservation of defensive capabilities sufficient to deter would-be aggressors; and the willingness to negotiate to resolve conflicts and reduce arms. The President warns the Soviet Union not to increase tensions in the Middle East.

Testimony by John Paul Vann, head of the pacification program in the Mekong Delta, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicates that the program is meeting with success.

Feb. 19—In a message to the Senate, the President calls for the ratification of the 1949 United Nations agreement outlawing genocide.

Feb. 22—In Liberia, Secretary of State Rogers ends his 10-nation African tour.

Feb. 23—Vice President Spiro Agnew greets French President Georges Pompidou in Washington as Pompidou arrives for an

8-day visit to the U.S. (See also *France*.)

Feb. 25—In a Senate speech, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R., Md.), criticizes U.S. military involvement in Laos as an executive subversion of the will of Congress. (See also *Laos*.)

The President requests Congress to pledge \$100 million to the Asian Development Bank over a 3-year period.

French President Pompidou addresses a joint session of Congress.

Feb. 26—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird assures Congress that the President will not send U.S. ground troops to fight in Laos without the Congress' consent.

U.S. officials report that the President and Pompidou did not reach an agreement on the Middle East; Pompidou leaves Washington for a 6-day U.S. tour.

Government

(See also *Civil Rights*)

Feb. 2—President Nixon presents a \$200.8-billion budget to Congress. The budget calls for reductions of more than \$6 billion in defense and space programs and increases in domestic programs that will cost \$3 billion in fiscal 1971. The new projects include revenue sharing with the states, welfare reform and curbs on water pollution.

The President sends a letter to Congress which contains detailed recommendations for revisions of the \$19.7-billion health, education and antipoverty appropriation measure which he vetoed January 26. The compromise measure he suggests calls for an appropriation of \$19,057,125,700 for the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Feb. 3—The Senate passes (83 to 4) a \$3.1-billion mass transit bill which increases the amount of discretionary funds that would be available to the Secretary of Transportation. The measure now goes to the House.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announces the appointment of Colonel Daniel James as Deputy Assistant Secre-

tary of Defense for Public Affairs. Colonel James will be the first uniformed military officer to hold the post.

Feb. 4—President Nixon issues an executive order calling for the elimination of air and water pollution by federal agencies. The federal agencies have less than 3 years to comply with state water and air pollution standards.

Feb. 5—The President holds a meeting in Indianapolis with the mayors of 10 cities and the Urban Affairs Council. The administration's 10-point program for attacking urban problems is outlined for the mayors.

Following criticism by the news media over the issuance of subpoenas to news organizations which have investigated the activities of radical political groups, Attorney General John N. Mitchell says that the Justice Department will take steps to assure that no subpoenas will be issued to members of the news media without first attempting to reach an agreement on the scope of the subpoenas. The news media fear that seizure of interview notes and film clips will frighten away informers who have been promised anonymity.

Feb. 6—The Senate rejects (43 to 32) an amendment to the aid-to-education bill that would have deleted aid to school districts serving children living in public housing units.

Feb. 8—A study conducted by staff members of the Senate Finance Committee scores the abuses of Medicare and Medicaid by doctors. The analysis calls for widespread reforms.

Feb. 9—The Labor Department announces increases in the amount of weekly salary that must be paid to executive, administrative and professional employees to exempt them from the premium overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the new rules which become effective on February 21, administrative personnel must be paid a minimum of \$125 a week and professional employees \$140 a week to qualify for the exemption.

Feb. 10—The President sends a message to

Congress calling for government action in air and water pollution control, solid waste disposal and increases in park lands and open spaces.

President Nixon signs a resolution to provide funds for federal education, health, labor and antipoverty programs until the vetoed appropriations bill is replaced.

Feb. 13—The Food and Drug Administration says that 26 of 28 samples of Mexican cookware have been found to contain lead, and warns housewives to stop using the pottery because of the possibility of lead poisoning.

Feb. 14—President Nixon extends the ban he placed on germ weapons on November 25, 1969, to include the production and use of military toxins. These are poisons that are biologically produced but are used as chemical warfare agents.

The Social Security Administration issues standards for fire resistance for carpets in nursing homes that qualify as extended care facilities under the Medicare program.

Feb. 16—Colonel Dee Ingold, an aide to General Lewis B. Hershey, is appointed acting director of the Selective Service System. General Hershey is relieved of his post. (See *Current History Annual 1970*, p. 101.)

Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe says that no new federal highway projects will be approved unless adequate replacement housing is first provided.

Feb. 17—The House Rules Committee deletes from the \$19.3-billion education bill a provision which would have given the President discretionary powers to reduce formula aid grants. The action raises the possibility that the President may veto the new measure.

President Nixon nominates Findlay Burns, Jr., as Ambassador to Ecuador and William Carter Burdett as Ambassador to Malawi.

Feb. 18—The President nominates Edward B. Miller for the position of chairman of the National Labor Relations Board.

Feb. 19—The House approves a \$19.4-billion health and education bill which now goes to the Senate. There is a strong possibility of a presidential veto.

Feb. 20—Releasing a 400-page Cabinet task force report on oil import control, the President postpones any "major" change in the oil import control program until conferences are held with foreign countries, especially with Canada.

Feb. 27—Commissioner of Education James E. Allen says the Office of Education will require school districts to show they are putting equal resources into disadvantaged area schools before school districts can receive federal aid.

Feb. 28—The Senate passes a revised version of the education appropriation bill. The bill eliminates amendments which would have forbidden busing or pupil assignment to aid in desegregation. The \$19-billion bill goes to Senate-House conference.

Labor

Feb. 3—The International Union of Electrical Workers announces that it has ratified a new contract with the General Electric Company. The union is the largest of 12 unions on strike against the company. Negotiations are continuing with the other unions representing General Electric workers, and similar settlements are expected.

Feb. 14—The United Automobile Workers requests the aid of Secretary of Labor George P. Schultz in achieving reverse seniority. The union, which has high lay-off benefits for workers with high seniority, claims that reverse seniority layoffs would help to prevent Negro despair that could lead to "new flareups of violence."

Feb. 18—The arrest of David Selden, national president of the American Federation of Teachers, brings the total number of teachers, union officials and sympathizers arrested in Newark, New Jersey, to 128. The teachers, ignoring a court injunction barring a strike, struck against

the Newark school system on February 2.

Feb. 27—President Nixon asks Congress to provide new strike curb machinery in the transportation industry.

Feb. 28—A threatened strike at Westinghouse Electric Corporation is averted as 3 major unions accept a company contract offer.

Military

Feb. 7—*The New York Times* reports that the Navy has requested an appropriation of \$44 million from Congress to pay for research on a nuclear-armed submarine fleet. The larger, quieter nuclear submarine would carry new, long-range missiles and would be known as an underwater long-range missile system (ULMS).

Feb. 9—A report by the General Accounting Office says that the Army, Navy and Air Force have been making many more officers eligible for graduate school than is necessary and that the forces have not made adequate use of the additional education when the officers return to service from school.

Feb. 10—In a report to Congress, the General Accounting Office charges that the Pentagon has frequently gone ahead with programs for new weapons development without "reasonable expectation of successful development."

Feb. 19—It is reported that letters have been sent from National Guard headquarters to Adjutants General across the country instructing them that effective March 1, 1970, they should recruit soldiers who are already trained in preference to men who do not have prior military training.

Feb. 20—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the U.S. may be in "a second rate strategic position" by the mid-1970's if the U.S.S.R. continues its missile program at its current rate.

Feb. 21—The replacement of the Selective Service System by a volunteer army is recommended by a presidential commission.

Feb. 23—Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and Senator John O. Pastore (D., R.I.) express reservations about administration plans for expanding the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

Feb. 24—Testifying before a session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Laird describes the administration's plan to defend a 3d Minuteman site with Safeguard missiles and to begin preliminary work on 5 other sites. ABM protection of 2 sites was approved in the Senate in 1969 by a single vote.

Feb. 26—Five U.S. marines are charged with murdering 11 South Vietnamese women and 5 children on February 19 near Danang.

Politics

Feb. 6—Senator Fred R. Harris resigns as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, a position the Oklahoman has held since January, 1969.

Feb. 9—The Democratic Policy Council asks for a "firm and unequivocal commitment" to withdraw all U.S. forces from Vietnam on a definite timetable. The council, which is the official voice of the Democratic party in policy matters, calls for a pull-out within 18 months.

Feb. 12—A poll conducted by Louis Harris says that the Democratic party no longer represents a majority. The poll indicates that 48 per cent of the national electorate is Democratic, 33 per cent Republican and 19 per cent independent.

Feb. 26—Former Democratic National Committee chairman Lawrence O'Brien refuses to accept reappointment to his former post.

Former Alabama Governor George C. Wallace says he will campaign for Alabama's Democratic gubernatorial nomination.

Student Unrest

Feb. 26—California's Governor Ronald Reagan declares a state of "extreme emer-

gency" in Santa Barbara after 3 days and nights of student rioting.

Supreme Court

Feb. 2—In a 6-to-2 decision the Court refuses to lift a ban on the broadcasting of lottery information.

The Supreme Court denies a hearing to Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D., N.Y.) who is attempting to recover the pay he lost because of his exclusion from the House in 1967, and is seeking recovery of a \$25,000 fine he paid in January, 1969, to regain his seat.

The Supreme Court upholds the power of states to regulate rates and operations of community antenna television companies.

Feb. 24—The Court affirms a lower court's ruling that New York State cannot deny welfare payments to persons who are unable to prove that they have moved to the state for reasons other than to go on the welfare rolls.

Feb. 25—In a 5-3 ruling, the Court declares that the election of school board members and most other local officials must comply with the principle of "one man, one vote."

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)


Feb. 25—Two opposition party deputies are convicted by a military court of having damaged national security through contacts with North Vietnamese. Tran Ngoc Chau is sentenced to 20 years at hard labor; Hoang Ho is sentenced to death in absentia.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See *Ethiopia*)

ZAMBIA

Feb. 15—U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers visits Zambia on his 10-nation African tour. He tells Zambians the U.S. deplors governments based on racial discrimination but does not believe violence provides a solution.



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